President Donald Trump told U.S. service members on November 28 that American forces will "very soon" begin land operations targeting drug traffickers in Venezuela, marking a sharp escalation from the maritime interdiction campaign that has already killed at least 83 people across 21 strikes since September. "The land is easier, but that's going to start very soon," Trump said during a Thanksgiving video call, adding, "We warn them: Stop sending poison to our country."
The announcement came twelve days after Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the U.S. intention to designate Venezuela's "Cartel de los Soles" as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, with the official designation taking effect on November 24, 2025. This legal move blurs the line between targeting non-state criminal networks and pressuring the Maduro government itself. Together, these developments signal a shift from offshore interdiction to a posture that could justify strikes inside Venezuelan territory—despite the fact that neither the FTO designation nor existing legal opinions explicitly authorize land attacks. The gap between operational momentum and legal authority creates an unstable foundation for what appears to be mission creep toward regime-focused targeting.
The authority problem
The administration's legal justification for this campaign rests on fragile ground. An Office of Legal Counsel opinion drafted to support maritime strikes against suspected drug vessels does not extend to land targets, according to CNN reporting from mid-October, when administration officials told lawmakers there was no legal basis for strikes inside Venezuela at that time. The FTO designation, while symbolically powerful and economically punitive, does not itself confer authority to use military force, legal experts have noted.
Yet the Senate has twice failed to limit Trump's authority for these operations, most recently on November 6, leaving the White House with significant latitude. Trump has asserted he can strike alleged traffickers abroad without new Congressional authorization, though he has said he would inform Congress before any land operations begin. This political space, combined with the FTO framing, creates a permissive environment for escalation without clear legal constraints or debate over whether counter-narcotics objectives can justify what looks increasingly like coercive pressure on a sovereign state.
Force posture and target logic
Operation Southern Spear, the umbrella campaign under U.S. Southern Command, has assembled a force disproportionate to typical counter-drug missions. More than a dozen warships and approximately 15,000 U.S. personnel are now positioned in the region, supported by B-52 and B-1 bomber flights near Venezuelan airspace and the presence of the Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group. This is not an interdiction flotilla; it is a coercive mechanism designed to project overwhelming power.
As we've documented, the operation's stated counter-narcotics rationale sits awkwardly alongside its military design. On October 30, the Wall Street Journal reported that U.S. officials had identified targets "at the nexus" of drug networks and the Maduro regime, including ports and airstrips that Venezuelan military personnel allegedly use for trafficking. A Center for Strategic and International Studies assessment outlined two potential target sets: pure cartel infrastructure or dual-use regime assets. Targeting the latter would maintain the counter-drug frame while applying direct pressure to Maduro's government, conflating criminal networks with state apparatus in ways that invite mission drift.
Members are reading: Why targeting Venezuelan infrastructure won't disrupt the drug economy's structural drivers and profitability.
Venezuelan response and escalation risks
Caracas has rejected the FTO designation and the broader U.S. framing. Foreign Minister Yván Gil called the terror label a fabrication designed to justify illegal intervention, while President Nicolás Maduro has consistently denied links to drug trafficking. Venezuela has responded with air defense demonstrations and militia mobilizations, creating the conditions for miscalculation in crowded airspace and waters where U.S. and Venezuelan forces now operate in close proximity.
The risk is not primarily conventional military confrontation—Venezuela's armed forces are no match for U.S. power projection. The danger lies in unintended escalation: a Venezuelan patrol boat approaching a U.S. destroyer, a surface-to-air battery locking onto a reconnaissance aircraft, or a miscommunication during a strike that kills civilians or hits a non-targeted facility. The dense U.S. maritime posture and Venezuela's defensive mobilization create friction points where tactical incidents can spiral.
An unstable equilibrium
The administration is constructing a campaign with contradictory logics. The counter-narcotics frame appeals domestically and provides international cover, while the force posture and targeting logic suggest regime pressure. The FTO designation of Cartel de los Soles blurs the distinction between non-state criminal actors and the Venezuelan government, but does not resolve the legal ambiguity around land strikes.
What emerges is an unstable equilibrium: military momentum building toward land operations without clear authority, strategic objectives that mix counter-drug and regime-change aims without coherent theory of victory, and escalation risks driven by proximity and political pressure rather than deliberate planning. Trump's "very soon" timeline suggests the decision has already been made, but the legal, strategic, and operational gaps remain unresolved.
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