When Kirill Dmitriev lands in Miami this weekend to meet U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, the gathering will mark the highest-profile iteration of a back-channel process that began in earnest after the failed Alaska summit and accelerated through a five-hour Moscow session in early December. Reuters and Axios report the Saturday meeting will focus on a U.S.-proposed framework to end the war in Ukraine—a plan that has evolved from an initial 28 points to a leaner 19-point draft following negotiations in Geneva and Florida. Yet the real test is not whether the draft exists, but whether it can survive contact with the enforcement problem that dooms most ceasefire architecture: who guarantees the terms, and with what power?
The core tension is straightforward. Moscow wants territorial concessions, permanent NATO renunciation, and a framework it can dominate through residual coercive leverage. Kyiv seeks security guarantees strong enough to deter the next offensive but may consider dropping its NATO bid only if those guarantees carry equivalent credibility. Washington's challenge is to bridge that gap without NATO membership, a ratified treaty, or the deep allied consensus that would make any agreement durable. From Moscow's perspective, the Miami track offers something valuable: a negotiation in which Russia shapes the text and the actors needed to enforce it—Europe and Ukraine—are consulted afterward, not during.
The process chain: Alaska to Miami
The diplomacy follows a clear sequence. Trump and Putin met in Alaska in early 2025; the summit collapsed when Russia demanded territorial concessions and NATO renunciation without offering enforceable reciprocal constraints. Subsequent reporting indicates the current U.S. framework draws from principles discussed there. In late October, Witkoff and Dmitriev convened in Miami and reportedly workshopped a 28-point plan—a session that raised immediate questions about sanctions protocols and the propriety of a Russian sovereign-fund chief shaping U.S. policy before formal consultation with Kyiv or Brussels.
That draft then entered a refining phase. Berlin hosted meetings with Ukrainian and European officials; Florida saw productive but inconclusive talks between Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Witkoff, Kushner, and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, covering security guarantees, frozen Russian assets, and a proposed Ukraine Development Fund. On December 2, Witkoff and Kushner spent five hours in Moscow with Putin, reviewing a revised plan. Now Dmitriev returns to Miami to assess any further movement. The question is whether this iterative back-channel can produce terms that Moscow will honor and that Kyiv and Europe will underwrite—or whether it simply generates a ceasefire text that unravels the moment Russian forces probe the line.
Positions: maximalism versus workability
Putin's demands remain clear and maximalist. Russia insists on recognition of its control over Crimea and all territories it claims in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson—including areas Ukraine still holds—plus Ukrainian withdrawal from those uncaptured zones, permanent NATO renunciation, and acceptance that foreign troops on Ukrainian soil constitute legitimate targets. On December 17, Putin warned that Russia would extend its gains if negotiations fail, a statement consistent with Moscow's battlefield posture: claiming initiative, expanding a "buffer zone," and conducting large-scale drone and missile campaigns designed to degrade Ukrainian infrastructure and will.
Ukraine's position, as conveyed through recent reporting, is that the latest U.S. draft is "workable" but "not perfect." Security guarantees have advanced in the text, but territorial control remains unresolved. Kyiv rejects ceding land outright and has signaled it might drop its NATO bid only in exchange for guarantees of equivalent deterrent weight—a standard no proposal has yet met. The uncomfortable truth is that guarantees without hard power invite violation, and the current process offers no NATO Article 5, no binding multilateral treaty, and no clear mechanism to punish breaches beyond sanctions Moscow has already absorbed.
Members are reading: Why a ceasefire without enforcement architecture favors Moscow and how process design undermines allied buy-in.
What comes next
The test for Miami is not whether Dmitriev, Witkoff, and Kushner shake hands or issue optimistic statements. It is whether the U.S. can secure credible constraints on Russian behavior while keeping Ukraine and Europe inside the negotiating tent. That means transparency about what is being proposed, meaningful consultation before finalization, and enforceable mechanisms that do not depend solely on Russian restraint. Absent those elements, any agreement becomes a prelude to the next offensive—delayed, perhaps, but not prevented.
Watch for three indicators after Miami: movement on ceasefire baselines and force-posture verification; concrete proposals for security guarantees that specify triggers, responders, and timelines; and evidence that European allies and Ukraine are co-drafting enforcement terms rather than merely reacting to a U.S.-Russian text. If those elements remain vague or are addressed through aspiration rather than architecture, the back-channel will have produced a document, not a durable peace.
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