The phone line between the White House and Caracas carried a blunt proposition: leave Venezuela now and save yourself and your inner circle, or face what comes next. Sources familiar with the exchange told the Miami Herald that the ultimatum was unambiguous—immediate exile in exchange for personal safety. Nicolás Maduro's government rejected the offer, instead seeking broad amnesty and retention of command over the armed forces even while permitting elections. Washington refused, and the diplomatic off-ramp closed.
That breakdown now collides with the most consequential shift in U.S. policy toward Venezuela in a generation. In late November 2025, the United States designated the Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, a network Washington claims is embedded within Venezuela's security apparatus. By treating elements of a sovereign state as a terrorist entity, the designation erases the legal boundary between counterterrorism operations and actions against state institutions—and creates the scaffolding for military escalation that the current force posture suggests is imminent.
The legal hinge: when a cartel becomes a government
The Foreign Terrorist Organization designation is more than a sanctions tool. It triggers material-support prohibitions, expands criminal liability for anyone transacting with the network, and—critically—signals a shift in how Washington frames the Venezuelan state itself. The Cartel de los Soles, according to U.S. indictments and Treasury designations, is not a shadowy external actor but a structure allegedly woven into the Bolivarian National Guard, intelligence services, and senior command layers. Caracas flatly denies the cartel's existence, calling it a fabrication designed to justify regime change.
The designation does not, by itself, authorize military force. Sanctions and FTO listings are legal tools short of war. Yet when paired with the administration's declaration of a "non-international armed conflict" against narco-terrorists, the public signaling of imminent land operations, and a naval deployment that now includes the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, the designation becomes the legal and rhetorical foundation for strikes that target what are, in practice, state facilities and personnel.
This blurring has profound consequences. If the United States strikes a National Guard depot or an intelligence site on the grounds that it serves the "cartel," it is conducting an attack on Venezuelan state infrastructure under the label of counterterrorism. International law scholars and UN human rights experts have warned that such framing does not inoculate the United States from Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The ultimatum phone call—offering exile in exchange for departure—reinforces the coercive intent and undercuts any claim that the military posture is purely defensive or counter-narcotic in nature.
Force posture: sufficient for strikes, insufficient for invasion
The hardware now arrayed across the southern Caribbean tells its own story. According to analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the deployed assets include an amphibious assault ship with embarked Marines, multiple Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, a littoral combat ship, an attack submarine, and—imminently or already on station—the Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group. The Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group brought an estimated 170 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles to the region as part of the broader military buildup in the Caribbean.
That is more than enough firepower for a limited, time-bound campaign of precision strikes against high-value targets: alleged cartel infrastructure, command nodes, coastal facilities. It is not, however, the force structure required for a ground invasion or sustained amphibious operation. Those would demand additional amphibious ready groups, significant air-mobile and heavy ground units, and the logistical tail to sustain them. Carrier strike groups are scarce and subject to competing global demands; the deployment clock is therefore a pressure, not a luxury.
What the posture does enable is rapid escalation. Air and missile strikes can be launched on short notice, and the presence of Marines aboard the amphibious ship provides a limited forced-entry or raid capability. The administration's public rhetoric aligns with this capability envelope: President Trump declared that Venezuelan airspace should be considered "closed," and the Federal Aviation Administration issued a safety advisory. Major international carriers have suspended routes into Caracas and other Venezuelan cities; Caracas has retaliated by revoking operating rights for some foreign airlines.
Members are reading: How the collapse of state-versus-criminal categories creates an escalation ladder with no clear off-ramps, even if Maduro departs.
The narrow window and the choice ahead
The current configuration is time-limited. Carrier strike groups rotate; the weather window in the southern Caribbean shifts; and the political calendar imposes its own pressures. The administration's willingness to place a direct phone call offering exile suggests awareness that military options carry high costs and uncertain outcomes. Yet the rejection of that offer, combined with the legal architecture now in place and the forces on station, points toward a near-term decision point.
International law experts and UN officials have argued that the threat of force, even absent actual strikes, violates Article 2(4). The President possesses inherent constitutional powers to use military force without congressional authorization for defensive purposes, such as responding to attacks, though Congress retains the power to declare war and authorize military force through Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMFs) for specific objectives. The administration maintains that self-defense and existing counterterrorism statutes provide sufficient legal basis, pointing to the illegitimacy of the Maduro government and the narco-terrorist threat. The gap between these positions is unbridgeable through legal argument alone; it will be resolved by decisions made in the next days or weeks.
The ultimatum was clear, the response was negative, and the hardware is in place. What began as a gradual tightening of sanctions and maritime interdiction has evolved into a framework that treats portions of a sovereign state as a terrorist organization and positions the United States for strikes on Venezuelan soil. Whether that framework is ever operationalized will determine not only Maduro's fate, but the trajectory of U.S.-Latin American relations and the international legal order governing the use of force for years to come.
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