The Istanbul gathering scheduled for Monday represents more than routine diplomatic choreography. When Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan welcomes his counterparts from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Pakistan, and Indonesia, the underlying question transcends immediate ceasefire mechanics: Who will define the post-conflict architecture in Gaza, and on whose terms? Turkey's initiative to convene this particular constellation of Muslim-majority states signals Ankara's strategic gambit to position itself as the indispensable broker in Palestinian affairs—a role that directly challenges both traditional Gulf mediation and Western-led frameworks.
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This meeting follows Fidan's engagement with Hamas delegation leader Khalil al-Hayya over the weekend, during which the Palestinian faction presented documentation alleging Israeli ceasefire violations while reaffirming its commitment to returning hostage remains. The sequencing matters: by hosting Hamas immediately before the broader ministerial gathering, Turkey demonstrates its willingness to maintain communication channels that much of the international community—and Israel specifically—views as legitimizing a designated terrorist organization. Fidan's public assertion that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu lacks genuine commitment to sustainable peace further underscores Ankara's willingness to stake out confrontational positions in service of Palestinian advocacy.
Yet beneath the diplomatic maneuvering lies a deeper structural question that has paralyzed previous peace efforts: Can fragmented Palestinian political authority translate into credible governance and security arrangements acceptable to regional powers, international stakeholders, and Israeli security imperatives? The answer will determine whether Istanbul's initiative represents a genuine pathway toward Palestinian self-determination or merely another chapter in the cyclical pattern of failed mediation.
Turkey's regional positioning and the architecture of Muslim multilateralism
Fidan's call for "coordinated action by Muslim countries" reflects Ankara's evolving foreign policy calculus under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's AKP government. Since the 2011 Arab uprisings, Turkey has systematically attempted to construct itself as the leading power within Sunni Muslim geopolitics, leveraging its Ottoman historical legacy, economic capabilities, and ideological affinity with political Islam movements. Gaza provides an ideal theater for this projection.
The composition of Monday's meeting reveals Turkey's strategic alignment choices. Qatar and Turkey have maintained parallel foreign policies on Palestine, both providing substantial support to Hamas and advocating for inclusive Palestinian political processes that incorporate the movement. Saudi Arabia and the UAE represent a more complex dynamic: while both have historically supported Palestinian causes, their recent normalization trajectories with Israel—accelerated through the Abraham Accords framework—have created tension with Ankara's more confrontational approach.
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The Hamas variable: Governance claims versus disarmament demands
Khalil al-Hayya's meeting with Fidan prior to the broader ministerial gathering illustrates the centrality of Hamas to any sustainable Gaza arrangement—and the impossibility of constructing such arrangements around the movement's current political and military posture. Hamas's presentation of alleged Israeli ceasefire violations and its commitment to returning hostage remains demonstrates the movement's attempt to position itself as a responsible interlocutor adhering to ceasefire terms while documenting Israeli transgressions.
This framing serves Hamas's strategic communication objectives but elides the fundamental question that has paralyzed previous peace processes: the movement's refusal to disarm voluntarily or subordinate its military capabilities to any broader Palestinian political authority. Hamas's military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, maintains operational independence from any governance structure that might emerge from Istanbul negotiations or broader diplomatic frameworks.
The Palestinian Authority, based in the West Bank under Fatah leadership, has consistently demanded that any Palestinian governance arrangement in Gaza must involve PA security forces and civilian administration. This position enjoys substantial international support, including from the United States and European partners. However, Hamas has repeatedly rejected subordination to PA authority, viewing Fatah as collaborationist and the PA security apparatus as compromised by coordination with Israeli intelligence services.
Turkey's engagement with Hamas occurs against this backdrop of irreconcilable Palestinian political divisions. Ankara has attempted to broker Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreements multiple times over the past fifteen years, with limited success. The 2011 Cairo Agreement and subsequent reconciliation efforts collapsed over fundamental disagreements regarding security sector integration, electoral processes, and control over border crossings. Monday's meeting cannot resolve these structural contradictions, but it may attempt to construct interim arrangements that defer resolution while establishing basic governance functionality.
Security architecture and the stability force mirage
Fidan's call for arrangements ensuring "security and administration of Gaza by Palestinians" implicitly references proposals for some form of international or regional stabilization force—an idea that has circulated through multiple previous peace processes without successful implementation. The concept typically envisions temporary deployment of forces from Muslim-majority or Arab states to provide security while Palestinian governance institutions develop capacity.
Members are reading: Why proposed stabilization forces cannot resolve the core contradiction between Israeli security demands and Hamas's refusal to disarm voluntarily.
Humanitarian imperatives amid political instrumentalization
Pakistan's stated priorities for Monday's meeting—"full implementation of the ceasefire, complete Israeli withdrawal, unfettered humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction efforts"—highlight the immense humanitarian crisis that continues regardless of political maneuvering. International organizations estimate that Gaza's infrastructure destruction exceeds $18 billion, with housing, water systems, healthcare facilities, and educational institutions suffering catastrophic damage. The humanitarian imperative demands immediate, sustained aid delivery and reconstruction planning.
Yet humanitarian assistance in Gaza has consistently been politicized and instrumentalized by all parties. Israel has maintained restrictions on dual-use materials and construction supplies, citing security concerns about potential military application. Hamas has historically diverted portions of humanitarian resources toward military infrastructure, including the extensive tunnel network beneath Gaza. International donors have demanded accountability mechanisms ensuring aid reaches civilian populations without strengthening Hamas's governance or military capabilities—requirements that Hamas views as infringement on Palestinian sovereignty.
Turkey has positioned itself as a major humanitarian supporter of Gaza, providing substantial aid through various mechanisms including Turkish NGOs with ties to the AKP government and direct coordination with Hamas authorities. This humanitarian engagement serves Turkey's broader strategic objectives by demonstrating Turkish solidarity with Palestinian suffering while building influence with Gaza's governing structures.
The reconstruction challenge extends beyond physical infrastructure to encompass governance capacity-building, economic development, and creation of sustainable employment for Gaza's young population. None of these objectives can be achieved without resolution of fundamental political questions regarding authority structures, external funding accountability, and security arrangements. Monday's meeting will likely produce commitments to humanitarian support and reconstruction assistance, but implementation depends entirely on resolving the same political contradictions that have paralyzed previous initiatives.
Structural contradictions and the persistence of fragmentation
The Istanbul gathering ultimately confronts the same structural reality that has frustrated decades of peace processes: the absence of unified Palestinian political authority capable of negotiating, implementing, and enforcing comprehensive agreements. The Oslo Accords presumed creation of such authority through gradual institution-building and negotiated territorial transfers. The post-Oslo period demonstrated that conflicting Palestinian factional interests, combined with Israeli settlement expansion and security restrictions, prevented emergence of effective unified governance.
Hamas's 2006 electoral victory and subsequent 2007 military takeover of Gaza formalized Palestinian political division along geographic lines. Subsequent reconciliation efforts—brokered by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey at various points—have failed to overcome fundamental disagreements regarding security sector control, electoral legitimacy, and relations with Israel. The current initiative cannot resolve these divisions without addressing the core issues that produced them: competing claims to represent Palestinian national interests, divergent strategic calculations regarding armed resistance versus negotiated settlement, and factional interests in preserving independent power bases.
Fidan's call for "security and administration of Gaza by Palestinians" assumes existence of Palestinian political structures capable of exercising such functions credibly. The reality remains far more complex: Hamas controls security apparatus and civil administration in Gaza; the Palestinian Authority maintains limited governance functions in parts of the West Bank under Israeli security oversight; neither commands legitimacy or capacity to govern Gaza under arrangements acceptable to Israel, regional powers, and international stakeholders simultaneously.
Turkey's initiative may produce interim frameworks deferring rather than resolving these contradictions—temporary arrangements allowing humanitarian assistance, partial reconstruction, and maintenance of fragile ceasefire while postponing fundamental political questions. Such outcomes, while preferable to renewed conflict, cannot constitute sustainable solutions without addressing underlying structural issues.
The question framing Monday's gathering is ultimately not whether participating states can articulate principles for Palestinian governance—these have been stated repeatedly across decades of diplomacy. The question is whether any configuration of regional powers, international stakeholders, and Palestinian factions can construct implementation mechanisms that overcome the fundamental contradictions between Hamas's refusal to disarm, Israel's security imperatives, Palestinian aspirations for meaningful self-determination, and regional powers' competing interests in Gaza's future orientation.
The Istanbul meeting represents Turkey's bid for regional leadership on Palestine through construction of Muslim multilateral frameworks. Yet convening power alone cannot transcend the structural contradictions that have paralyzed previous peace efforts. Fidan's initiative may produce important diplomatic developments, particularly regarding humanitarian coordination and reconstruction planning. But the core questions—Hamas's military capabilities, Palestinian political unity, Israeli security guarantees, and governance legitimacy—remain as intractable as ever.
For Turkish foreign policy, the gathering serves multiple objectives regardless of immediate outcomes: demonstrating Ankara's relevance to Palestinian affairs, positioning Turkey as the indispensable Muslim-world broker, and pressuring both Arab states and Western powers to acknowledge Turkish interests in regional architecture. These strategic gains accrue to Turkey whether or not Monday's meeting produces implementable frameworks for Palestinian governance.
For Gaza's population, enduring catastrophic humanitarian conditions amid destroyed infrastructure and fractured governance, the diplomatic maneuvering in Istanbul offers little immediate relief. Sustainable improvement requires not merely ceasefire maintenance but construction of governance arrangements enabling reconstruction, economic development, and movement toward self-determination. The structural contradictions examined above suggest that Monday's gathering, however diplomatically significant, cannot deliver the fundamental political transformation necessary for Gaza's recovery.
The pattern persists: international meetings produce communiqués affirming principles while deferring mechanisms; ceasefires hold temporarily while underlying drivers remain unaddressed; humanitarian crises deepen as political paralysis continues. Turkey's initiative joins this established pattern, unlikely to break its fundamental dynamics without unprecedented shifts in core party positions—shifts that current regional and international configurations make difficult to envision.
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