- Trump-brokered peace formalizes Azerbaijan's military victory and 2023 ethnic cleansing of 100,000+ Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh
- 99-year US-controlled TRIPP corridor through Armenia reshapes regional power, bypassing Russia and Iran entirely
- Peace depends on Armenia's 2026 constitutional referendum, corridor implementation success, and unresolved justice for displaced populations
On August 8, 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a historic peace agreement at the White House, mediated by former US President Donald Trump. The ceremony marked a watershed moment in a conflict that has claimed over 30,000 lives since 1988 and displaced hundreds of thousands on both sides. The agreement includes provisions for mutual territorial recognition, the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group mediation mandate, and perhaps most significantly, a US-operated transit corridor through southern Armenia connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave—officially named the "Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity" (TRIPP).
Yet even as the leaders exchanged handshakes in Washington, the scars of September 2023 remain raw. Just two years ago, Azerbaijan's lightning military offensive forced more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee Nagorno-Karabakh in a chaotic exodus that international observers characterized as ethnic cleansing. Today, Azerbaijan is resettling the region with ethnic Azerbaijanis while prosecuting sixteen former Armenian officials on terrorism charges. Meanwhile, significant challenges persist: displaced persons face uncertain futures, humanitarian concerns remain unaddressed, and Russian peacekeepers have withdrawn, leaving security arrangements dependent on bilateral cooperation and an untested peace framework.
The question now is whether this US-brokered agreement can transform decades of enmity into sustainable peace—or whether it merely freezes a conflict that could reignite at any moment.
The Long Road to Washington
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began in 1988 during the final years of the Soviet Union, when ethnic Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—then part of Soviet Azerbaijan—demanded unification with Armenia. What started as a political dispute quickly escalated into ethnic violence and, following the Soviet collapse in 1991, full-scale war.
The First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1991-1994) resulted in an estimated 30,000 deaths and the displacement of approximately 353,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 500,000 to 700,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia and the surrounding territories. By the war's end, Armenian forces controlled not only Nagorno-Karabakh but also seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts. A Russian-brokered ceasefire in May 1994 established a fragile peace that would last, with periodic violations, until 2016.
For nearly three decades, the OSCE Minsk Group—co-chaired by the United States, France, and Russia—attempted to mediate a permanent settlement. Despite countless meetings and proposals, territorial disputes remained intractable. The conflict was widely considered "frozen," a term that belied the simmering tensions and sporadic violence that claimed lives year after year.
The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 shattered this uneasy status quo. From September 27 to November 9, Azerbaijan—backed militarily and diplomatically by Turkey—launched a major offensive that reclaimed most of the territory it had lost in the 1990s. The 44-day war killed more than 7,000 soldiers and civilians, with Azerbaijan's widespread use of drones proving decisive. A November 9, 2020 ceasefire brokered by Russia left Azerbaijan in control of approximately 75% of the territories it had lost, while Russian peacekeepers were deployed to monitor the remaining Armenian-controlled areas and secure the Lachin corridor—the sole road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.
But even this arrangement proved temporary. In December 2022, Azerbaijan began blocking the Lachin corridor, ostensibly due to environmental protests by Azerbaijani activists. The blockade, which international observers widely viewed as state-sponsored, created a humanitarian catastrophe. For nine months, Nagorno-Karabakh's 120,000 residents faced severe shortages of food, medicine, fuel, and other essentials. Bread was rationed to one loaf per family per day. The region's gas supply was cut from March to September 2023. Emergency reserves dwindled as Azerbaijan prevented even Red Cross deliveries from reaching the besieged population.
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The Displacement Crisis One Year Later
Today, one year after the exodus, the displaced Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh face an uncertain future in Armenia. The refugee influx represents approximately 4% of Armenia's entire population—a demographic shock that has strained the country's limited resources.
While the initial absorption was relatively smooth, with refugees staying with relatives, finding rental housing, or occupying government-run accommodation, long-term integration has proven challenging. The Armenian government announced it will cut rental subsidies starting in 2026 and has rolled out a phased program to provide one-time payments to help refugees purchase homes. However, the program has drawn criticism from advocacy groups. Journalist Tatevik Khachatrian, who hosts a podcast about Nagorno-Karabakh issues, noted that her family won't be eligible for assistance until the third phase in 2027. "People have completely lost faith [in the government] and have come to terms with the fact that this is how it is," she said. "This also means that people will have to emigrate."
Indeed, over 10,000 refugees from Karabakh have already left Armenia, many heading for Russia. Those who remain face social discrimination and resentment from some Armenians who view them as a burden on an already under-resourced country. "There is obvious discrimination against people from Artsakh," Khachatrian said. "It is influenced by the media, government propaganda that 'we give this or that to people from Artsakh,' while in reality they don't give us anything."
The question of return remains deeply contentious. While officials from the United States, Europe, and Russia have mentioned the rights of the Armenian population to return to Karabakh in their statements, the Armenian government itself has poured cold water on the possibility. Artur Hovannisian, a lawmaker from the ruling Civil Contract party, told RFE/RL's Armenian Service: "All those who are trying to convince the people of Nagorno-Karabakh that there is a possibility of return are adventurers trying to create tension in Armenia...in order to put a new political leash on Armenia's neck."
The November 2023 International Court of Justice ruling that Azerbaijan must allow refugees to return if they desire has had little practical effect. Azerbaijan has proceeded at full speed with its resettlement program, allocating over $11 billion to reconstruct Nagorno-Karabakh and settling thousands of displaced Azerbaijanis in formerly Armenian-inhabited areas.
Azerbaijan's "Great Return" and Reconstruction
While Armenians fled Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan launched an ambitious reconstruction and resettlement program officially titled the "Great Return" State Program, covering 2022-2026. The government aims to resettle an estimated 140,000 internally displaced Azerbaijanis across 100 rebuilt settlements in the Karabakh and Eastern Zangezur economic regions by the end of 2026.
The reconstruction effort faces formidable challenges. The territories remain heavily mined and contaminated with unexploded ordnance. According to international monitoring organizations and ICRC reports from early 2025, landmine and unexploded ordnance casualties have surged dramatically, with civilian victims constituting over 80% of casualties globally—a pattern replicated in the Karabakh region where mine contamination presents one of the most severe humanitarian challenges. While 30,000 mines and unexploded devices have been cleared, it is estimated that removing all landmines will take at least 25 years and cost over $50 billion.
Despite these obstacles, Azerbaijan has made significant progress. Since 2021, approximately $11.2 billion has been allocated from the state budget for restoration and reconstruction. Turkish companies, given priority due to Turkey's diplomatic and military support for Baku, have reportedly secured contracts worth $3.4 billion for infrastructure projects.
As of January 2025, the total number of IDP returnee families stands at 2,614, comprising 10,274 individuals across ten settlements. The largest concentrations are in Fuzuli city (3,132 people), Lachin city (2,090 people), and Shusha city (1,386 people). However, this pace falls far short of the government's targets. At the current rate of approximately 3,333 IDPs resettled per year, it would take roughly 39 years to repopulate Karabakh with the targeted 140,000 returnees.
The reconstruction has not been without controversy. Satellite imagery examined by Caucasus Heritage Watch, an academic organization documenting cultural heritage, has revealed the destruction of Armenian heritage sites, including a 19th-century Armenian church in Susa (known to Armenians as Shushi). Other Armenian cultural monuments, including cemeteries and homes, have been bulldozed during road construction. Azerbaijan has systematically removed Armenian inscriptions from buildings, torn down structures built by the former separatist authorities, and repurposed infrastructure for Azerbaijani use.
President Aliyev celebrated some of these demolitions during a March 2024 visit to mark the Norouz holiday. "There is no longer any trace of separatists here," he declared. "The Norouz bonfire is doing the final cleaning."
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The Constitutional Hurdle and Implementation Challenges
Even as the August 2025 agreement was celebrated in Washington, significant obstacles to final ratification remain. Chief among them is Azerbaijan's insistence that Armenia change its constitution before the peace treaty can be signed.
Azerbaijan objects to language in the preamble of Armenia's current constitution that references a 1990 declaration of independence calling for the "reunification" of Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh. For Baku, this reference represents an ongoing territorial claim that must be definitively eliminated.
Armenia has not refused this demand, but Prime Minister Pashinyan insists on presenting constitutional reform as an Armenian initiative rather than capitulation to Azerbaijani pressure. Pashinyan has stated that a new constitution will be ready for a referendum in 2026, with a draft prepared before the 2026 parliamentary elections. However, Armenian officials argue that Azerbaijan's focus on the constitutional issue is a pretext for scuttling peace talks.
The referendum faces significant political hurdles. To pass, the new constitution must receive a majority of votes cast and secure votes from at least 25% of the total registered electorate. Given popular frustration with what many Armenians view as Azerbaijani bullying, this threshold may be difficult to overcome. Pashinyan's political vulnerability was highlighted by his party's poor showing in local elections in March 2025, which may bode ill for a constitution so closely associated with the prime minister.
If the constitutional referendum fails, Azerbaijan will likely cite it as evidence that Armenia is not genuinely committed to peace. Renewed conflict would become significantly more likely.
Meanwhile, tensions along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border continue to simmer. The beginning of 2025 saw a spike in incidents, with Azerbaijan's defense ministry repeatedly alleging ceasefire violations by Armenia. Just three days before the March 2025 announcement that the agreement's text was settled, a news website associated with Azerbaijan's Ministry of Defense published a report claiming Armenia planned to start a new war in April. Armenia has denied the accusations and presented evidence that Azerbaijan is itself violating the ceasefire.
Both countries are also building up their militaries. Since 2020, both have more than doubled their defense budgets. Armenia, which historically relied almost exclusively on Russia for weaponry, is now purchasing French and Indian weapons and seeking other partners. Azerbaijan continues to spend far more on arms than Armenia, buying heavily from Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, Serbia, and Slovakia.
Azerbaijan also continues to occupy small but strategic slices of internationally recognized Armenian territory, which it has controlled since its 2022 campaign. Armenia, worried about a potential operation to cleave the country in two, has been building defensive fortifications in border areas where officials say Azerbaijan has been violating the ceasefire.
The Unresolved Question of Justice
Perhaps the most painful omission from the August 2025 agreement is any meaningful provision for transitional justice, accountability for war crimes, or the right of return for displaced persons.
In 2025, Azerbaijan initiated trials against sixteen former ethnic Armenian officials from Nagorno-Karabakh, most notably the region's former state minister Ruben Vardanyan, a prominent businessman. Armenian officials have criticized the proceedings as "mock trials," citing restricted media access and what they characterize as arbitrary terrorism charges. Vardanyan was detained by Azerbaijani forces on September 27, 2023, just as he was attempting to enter Armenia during the mass exodus.
Armenia filed a case with the International Court of Justice in April 2024, accusing Azerbaijan of committing ethnic cleansing. Azerbaijan responded with a countersuit. In November 2024, the ICJ ruled that both parties could proceed with their respective cases, but the legal process will take years, and enforcement of any eventual ruling remains uncertain.
The question of cultural heritage is equally fraught. Despite Azerbaijani authorities' assurances regarding the protection of cultural and religious monuments, satellite imagery and reports from organizations like Caucasus Heritage Watch document systematic destruction of Armenian churches, cemeteries, and other heritage sites. The ICJ's December 2021 order requiring Azerbaijan to "take all necessary measures to prevent and punish acts of vandalism and desecration affecting Armenian cultural heritage" appears to have had limited effect.
For the displaced Armenians, the right of return remains theoretical at best. While the November 2023 ICJ ruling affirmed that Azerbaijan must allow refugees to return if they desire, and that return must be voluntary, safe, and dignified, no concrete mechanisms exist to implement this right. Most displaced Armenians interviewed by researchers say they would consider returning only under international protection, with guarantees of Armenian-language education, religious freedom, and community governance—conditions Azerbaijan has shown no willingness to provide.
Tatevik Khachatrian, the displaced journalist, expressed the sentiment shared by many: "I don't know a single Armenian who would say they are ready to live in Artsakh" under current conditions. Yet she maintains hope for the long term: "None of us know what to expect in the future, what geopolitical changes might happen. Maybe things will change in a way that what seems impossible today will become possible tomorrow. And maybe one day Artsakh will become Armenian again. At least that's the dream I have and instill in my child as well."
Azerbaijan regards such sentiments as revanchist and is working to stamp out any remaining embers of Armenian ambition to retake Karabakh. This includes pressuring Armenia to change its constitution and avoiding any mention of the Armenian population except in reference to the separatist leadership that has been prosecuted.
Among Azerbaijani returnees to Nagorno-Karabakh, there is little interest in the return of their former Armenian neighbors. Vasila Mammadova, who fled the village of Xocali during the first war and whose husband was killed in 1992, visited the area on a government-sponsored trip after the 2023 offensive. Before the first war, she recalled, there was friendly contact between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. "But not now," she said. "My four children were left fatherless, and I was left homeless. How can I be friends with them? Maybe time will solve the problem. I don't know. But my heart cannot be healed."
Conclusion: Peace Without Reconciliation?
The August 8, 2025 peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan represents a historic milestone—the first formal framework to end a conflict that has defined the South Caucasus for nearly four decades. The ceremony in Washington, with its symbolic handshakes and diplomatic language, offers a vision of normalized relations, economic cooperation, and regional stability.
Yet the agreement is better understood as a formalization of Azerbaijan's military victory than a genuine reconciliation between peoples. Azerbaijan has achieved its core objectives: full territorial control over Nagorno-Karabakh, international recognition of its sovereignty over the region, and the effective removal of the Armenian population. Armenia has made concession after concession, accepting the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for promises of peace and the hope of economic integration through the TRIPP corridor.
Three critical questions will determine whether this peace endures. First, can Armenia's constitutional referendum succeed despite domestic opposition and political vulnerability? Failure would provide Azerbaijan with a pretext to abandon the agreement and potentially launch new military operations.
Second, will the TRIPP corridor deliver the promised economic benefits, or will it become another source of friction? Iran's threat to block the corridor, combined with Russia's hostility to Western encroachment in its traditional sphere of influence, suggests that implementation will face significant external resistance. The corridor's success depends not only on construction and financing but on the willingness of regional powers to accept a fundamental shift in the South Caucasus power balance.
Third, and most fundamentally, can peace be sustainable without justice for the displaced, accountability for war crimes, or meaningful protection for cultural heritage? The international community's failure to prevent ethnic cleansing in 2023, followed by an agreement that effectively ratifies the results of that cleansing, sets a troubling precedent. As Aram Hamparian, executive director of the Armenian National Committee of America, argued: "Normalizing ethnic cleansing is not peace."
For the more than 100,000 displaced Armenians now scattered across Armenia and beyond, the agreement offers little hope of return. For the Azerbaijanis resettling in Nagorno-Karabakh, the peace brings the possibility of rebuilding lives destroyed in the 1990s, but in a region still haunted by trauma and mistrust. For the United States, the agreement represents a geopolitical victory, expanding influence in a strategic region at Russia's and Iran's expense.
The next six to twelve months will be critical. The constitutional referendum, scheduled for 2026, will test whether Armenia's population is willing to formally relinquish claims to Nagorno-Karabakh. The first phases of TRIPP corridor development will reveal whether the ambitious infrastructure project can overcome technical, financial, and political obstacles. And the continued absence of military incidents along the border will indicate whether both sides are genuinely committed to peace or merely observing a temporary pause before the next round of conflict.
History suggests caution. The 1994 ceasefire lasted 26 years before collapsing into the 2020 war. The 2020 ceasefire lasted less than two years before Azerbaijan's blockade and offensive. This agreement may prove more durable, backed by American guarantees and economic incentives that previous arrangements lacked. But it may also prove to be merely another chapter in a conflict that has yet to find its final resolution—a peace without reconciliation, built on the displacement of one people and the triumph of another, waiting for the next geopolitical shift to unsettle its fragile foundations.
