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As India and Pakistan navigate a fragile ceasefire, escalating violence between Islamabad and Kabul threatens to destabilize the region further and reshape the geopolitical landscape
The fragile ceasefire between India and Pakistan, brokered in mid-May after four days of intense military confrontation, has barely settled when a new crisis threatens to unravel South Asia's already precarious security architecture. Recent days have witnessed a dramatic escalation along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, with sustained clashes resulting in more than a dozen civilian casualties and significant military damage on both sides. This violence, occurring against the backdrop of the May India-Pakistan conflict—dubbed Operation Sindoor—represents a dangerous multiplication of regional flashpoints that could overwhelm diplomatic efforts to maintain stability.
While international attention remains focused on the India-Pakistan dynamic following their most serious military confrontation since 1971, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border has quietly emerged as a potentially more volatile theater. The timing is particularly concerning: as Pakistan grapples with the aftermath of its conflict with India, including damage to critical military infrastructure and the psychological impact of what many analysts view as a strategic setback, it now faces sustained hostilities on its western frontier. This two-front security challenge arrives at a moment when Pakistan's conventional military capabilities have been tested, its diplomatic isolation has deepened, and its economic vulnerabilities have been exposed.
Can the region's nuclear-armed states manage multiple simultaneous crises without catastrophic miscalculation? The answer may determine South Asia's trajectory for years to come.
The Pakistan-Afghanistan border violence represents more than a bilateral dispute—it signals a fundamental shift in South Asia's security environment. According to multiple sources, the clashes have resulted in substantial damage to military posts and assets on both sides, with civilian populations bearing the brunt of the violence. The escalation comes as Pakistan simultaneously manages the diplomatic and military fallout from Operation Sindoor, during which India conducted precision strikes against nine sites across Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir on May 7, 2025.
The May conflict with India inflicted considerable damage on Pakistan's military infrastructure. India's strikes targeted what New Delhi characterized as "terrorist infrastructure," but the operation's scope extended well beyond symbolic gestures. Indian forces utilized precision-guided artillery, drone-delivered munitions, and advanced cruise missiles including the BrahMos and European SCALP-EG systems—marking several military firsts in the India-Pakistan rivalry. Pakistan's retaliatory Operation Bunyanun Marsoos employed conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles, including the Fatah-I and Fatah-II systems, representing the first use of such weapons against India.
Most significantly, an Indian missile reportedly struck near the Nur Khan air base in Rawalpindi, dangerously close to Pakistani command and control centers that oversee the country's nuclear weapons. This proximity to Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure heightened international alarm and prompted urgent mediation by the United States, which ultimately brokered the May 10 ceasefire.
Now, with military resources stretched and diplomatic capital depleted, Pakistan confronts renewed violence on its western border with Afghanistan. The timing could hardly be worse. As one analysis noted, "Pakistan got a good glimpse of India's existing strengths and weaknesses" during Operation Sindoor, and observers expect Islamabad to seek advanced weapons from China to even the scales. But this arms race requires resources and strategic focus that the Afghanistan border violence directly threatens.
The India factor: Strategic calculations amid dual pressures
India's military posture remains aggressive despite the ceasefire. Lieutenant General Manoj Kumar Katiyar, the Western Army commander, confirmed in mid-October that any future "Operation Sindoor 2.0 will be deadlier and more powerful" in response to threats such as the Pahalgam-style terrorist attacks that killed 26 civilians in April 2025. This statement, delivered months after the May conflict, demonstrates New Delhi's determination to maintain pressure on Pakistan and establish what Prime Minister Narendra Modi called a "new normal" in responding to terrorism.
The Indian military's confidence stems from what it views as a successful demonstration of conventional superiority during Operation Sindoor. According to the Indian Air Force chief, India downed six Pakistani aircraft during the May clash, most using the Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missile system, citing electronic tracking data as confirmation. While Pakistan disputes these claims—a pattern consistent with the "exceptional disinformation and misinformation" that characterized the conflict—the psychological impact on both militaries is undeniable.
India's military modernization continues apace, with recent initiatives including a large-scale drone exercise scheduled for early October to evaluate air defense effectiveness following the conflict's extensive use of unmanned systems. The exercise responds to what analysts characterize as a regional "drone arms race" triggered by the May hostilities, during which both sides employed drones with destructive intent for the first time in their rivalry.
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The ceasefire's fragile foundations
The May 10 ceasefire between India and Pakistan, while holding in its basic contours, remains vulnerable to violation and misinterpretation. Both sides have accused each other of breaches, with India claiming Pakistan broke the ceasefire within hours of its announcement. The respective Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) have communicated over the hotline regarding alleged violations along the Line of Control, demonstrating that communication channels remain open even as trust remains minimal.
The ceasefire's origins reveal the limits of bilateral crisis management. According to Pakistani sources, the agreement emerged after closed and direct talks between the DGMOs and representatives of the national security advisors, with behind-the-scenes encouragement from U.S. President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and possibly Saudi Arabia. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif thanked Trump for his role in bringing "lasting peace to South Asia," while India's foreign ministry notably omitted any mention of third-party mediation, stating only that India and Pakistan "worked out an understanding to stop the military action."
This divergence in public narratives reflects deeper disagreements about the conflict's nature and resolution. Pakistan has called for an independent investigation into the April 22 Pahalgam attack, asserting India provided insufficient evidence of Pakistani involvement. India maintains that Pakistan's denials lack credibility and that the strikes were justified retaliation against terrorist infrastructure. These incompatible positions leave little room for the "broad set of dialogues" the ceasefire agreement envisions.
The diplomatic measures India implemented before the May strikes remain in effect, severely constraining bilateral engagement. New Delhi suspended the Indus Waters Treaty—a critical transboundary water accord that has survived previous wars—for the first time in its sixty-five-year history. India also halted all trade, terminated visa-free travel arrangements, and closed the Attari border crossing, the only open land border between the countries. Pakistan responded by closing its airspace to Indian commercial airlines and suspending bilateral trade.
These non-military punitive measures create structural obstacles to normalization that will outlast any tactical ceasefire. The water issue particularly concerns observers, as both countries face drought-like conditions and the suspension occurred during peak summer demand. Pakistan has warned that any attempt to alter Indus River flows would be considered "an act of war," while Indian officials have suggested the treaty's suspension reflects Pakistan's failure to address terrorism.
Regional realignments and great power interests
The May crisis and its aftermath have accelerated geopolitical realignments that will shape South Asia's future. The conflict exposed contradictions in U.S. policy toward the region, particularly regarding Pakistan's status as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). From New Delhi's perspective, this designation—which India does not have—sends contradictory signals. While U.S. policymakers express solidarity with India during crises, they continue offering Pakistan privileged military status without conditioning it on measurable counterterrorism compliance.
The original justification for Pakistan's MNNA status—logistical cooperation during the U.S. war in Afghanistan—has expired. China is now Pakistan's primary defense partner, and U.S. assistance has largely dried up. Some analysts argue that revoking MNNA status would rebalance Washington's ties with Islamabad and recognize strategic realities, while reinforcing India's role as an independent regional security provider.
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Nuclear shadows and conventional risks
The May crisis brought India and Pakistan closer to nuclear confrontation than at any time since their 1998 tests. The strike near Pakistan's Nur Khan air base, close to nuclear command and control centers, triggered Pakistani fears of "decapitation" of the National Command Authority—the highest-ranking body on nuclear and missile policy. Despite official statements about convening the NCA, Pakistan denied the meeting took place, adding to the fog of war and disinformation that characterized the conflict.
Nuclear rhetoric escalated throughout the crisis. Pakistan's ambassador to Russia stated that Pakistan would use "both conventional and nuclear" weapons if India escalated or cut off water supplies. A Pakistani minister warned India that Pakistan's missiles were "kept for India," and if India halts water supply, it should prepare for war. While nuclear rhetoric is not new to India-Pakistan crises, the specific linkage to critical infrastructure like water supplies represents a dangerous expansion of potential triggers for nuclear use.
India's defense minister subsequently called for International Atomic Energy Agency oversight of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, which Pakistan strongly criticized. The exchange reflects deeper anxieties about nuclear safety and security in a region where conventional conflicts increasingly involve strikes on sensitive military infrastructure.
The conflict also highlighted the evolving nature of conventional deterrence under the nuclear shadow. India's willingness to strike targets in Pakistan's heartland—including Muridke and Bahawalpur in Punjab, locations long considered too sensitive for military action—demonstrated that old geographic safe havens no longer constrain Indian military planning. This expansion of India's willingness to use force, what Modi termed a "new normal," suggests that future crises may involve even more extensive conventional operations, increasing the risk of inadvertent escalation to nuclear use.
Pakistan's response included the first-ever use of conventionally armed ballistic missiles against India, representing a significant escalation in weapons employment. The Fatah-I and Fatah-II missiles, while conventionally armed, blur the line between conventional and nuclear delivery systems in ways that could complicate crisis decision-making. In a future confrontation, Indian early warning systems detecting incoming ballistic missiles might not immediately distinguish between conventional and nuclear warheads, potentially triggering responses based on worst-case assumptions.
The role of third-party weapons in the conflict adds another layer of complexity to nuclear stability calculations. India's use of French Rafale jets and SCALP cruise missiles, Israeli precision-guided munitions, and Russian BrahMos missiles, combined with Pakistan's employment of Chinese J-10C jets and PL-15 missiles, means that future conflicts will involve weapons systems whose performance characteristics and vulnerabilities are known to multiple countries. This internationalization of conventional capabilities could affect crisis calculations in unpredictable ways.
Kashmir's unresolved status
The Kashmir dispute remains the fundamental driver of India-Pakistan tensions, and the May crisis has only hardened positions on both sides. India's August 2019 revocation of Article 370 of the constitution, which removed Jammu and Kashmir's special status, continues to generate resentment among Kashmiris and anger in Pakistan. The change forced Kashmiris to abide by Indian property and customary law, effectively diminishing their autonomy in what Pakistan views as a "grave injustice."
The April 22 Pahalgam attack that triggered the May crisis specifically targeted tourists, with eyewitness accounts reporting a communal nature to the killings, with Hindu males singled out for death. The attack's civilian focus represented a departure from recent militant operations that had primarily targeted security forces. By killing tourists, the attackers called into question the Modi government's claims of restored normalcy in Kashmir and complicated efforts to encourage tighter integration between Kashmir and the rest of India.
India's response to the Pahalgam attack included not only the May military strikes but also a sustained crackdown in Kashmir. Indian security forces arrested over 1,500 Kashmiris and demolished homes of suspected militants. This heavy-handed approach, while intended to prevent future attacks, risks generating additional grievances that militant groups can exploit for recruitment and propaganda.
Pakistan continues to frame Kashmir as an internationally recognized disputed territory whose final status should be determined through a UN-supervised plebiscite, as envisioned in UN Security Council resolutions from 1948-49. At the UN General Assembly's Special Political and Decolonization Committee, Pakistani delegate Asif Khan stated that "Jammu and Kashmir is not, and has never been, an integral part of India," rejecting Indian claims of sovereignty. He cited Pakistan's position that Kashmir's status must be determined through "a free and impartial plebiscite under the UN auspices."
India rejects this framing entirely, insisting that Kashmir is an integral part of India and that the only issues for discussion are Pakistan's occupation of parts of Kashmir and cross-border terrorism. This fundamental incompatibility of positions leaves no middle ground for negotiation. As Prime Minister Modi stated after Operation Sindoor, "If we ever talk to Pakistan, it will be on terror and PoK [Pakistan-occupied Kashmir] only."
The Khalistan dimension adds complexity to the Kashmir issue and broader India-Pakistan tensions. During the May crisis, Pakistan accused India of launching drones to target Sikhs in Nankana Sahib, a Sikh holy city in Pakistan's Punjab province. India denied the accusation, but the allegation prompted the pro-Khalistan group Sikhs for Justice to call on Indian Sikh soldiers to desert and form their own forces. The group's leader, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, declared that "twenty million Sikhs stand with Pakistan like a brick wall."
India views Khalistan supporters as terrorists and has accused both Canada and Pakistan of providing them safe haven. The issue figured prominently in India's post-ceasefire diplomatic offensive, with seven delegations of senior parliamentarians and former diplomats dispatched to thirty-three global capitals to refocus attention on terrorism threats India faces. When these delegations visited Washington, they were heckled by Khalistan supporters, while Pakistani delegations in the same city accused India of targeting Sikhs in Canada.
Looking ahead: Uncertain trajectories
The convergence of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border violence with the fragile India-Pakistan ceasefire creates a regional security environment more volatile than at any time since the 1971 war. Pakistan faces a two-front challenge with diminished conventional capabilities, strained economic resources, and growing diplomatic isolation. India maintains military pressure through aggressive rhetoric and continued modernization, while expanding its regional diplomatic footprint through engagement with Afghanistan's Taliban government.
The structural factors that enabled the May crisis remain in place. Terrorist groups continue to operate in the region, whether state-sponsored or acting independently. The Kashmir dispute remains unresolved, with no prospect of negotiations given the incompatibility of Indian and Pakistani positions. Nuclear weapons constrain but do not eliminate the use of military force, and both countries have demonstrated increasing comfort with limited conventional operations below the nuclear threshold.
The international community's role in managing South Asian crises remains reactive rather than preventive. The United States brokered the May ceasefire but has not articulated a long-term strategy for addressing underlying drivers of instability. China's growing influence provides Beijing with opportunities to position itself as a mediator and security provider, potentially at the expense of traditional U.S. influence. Russia maintains balanced relations with both India and Pakistan but lacks the leverage to impose solutions.
Three scenarios merit consideration for the coming months. First, the ceasefire could gradually strengthen as both sides recognize the costs of sustained confrontation and engage in limited confidence-building measures. This optimistic scenario seems least likely given the depth of mutual mistrust and the absence of diplomatic mechanisms for addressing core disputes.
Second, the ceasefire could persist in form while eroding in substance, with periodic violations along the Line of Control and continued sub-conventional conflict through terrorist proxies. This scenario of "ugly stability"—sustained tension without major war—has characterized much of the India-Pakistan relationship and may represent the most probable near-term trajectory.
Third, a new trigger event—whether another terrorist attack, a border incident, or miscalculation during the Pakistan-Afghanistan violence—could shatter the ceasefire and initiate a new crisis potentially more severe than May's confrontation. This scenario carries the highest risk of nuclear escalation, particularly if it occurs while Pakistan remains engaged on its western border and feels strategically vulnerable.
The Pakistan-Afghanistan border violence suggests the third scenario's plausibility is increasing. A Pakistan distracted by western border conflicts may prove less able to manage tensions with India effectively, while India may perceive Pakistan's two-front predicament as an opportunity for additional pressure. The combination of opportunity and vulnerability creates conditions ripe for miscalculation.
As Lieutenant General Katiyar's promise of a "deadlier and more powerful" Operation Sindoor 2.0 makes clear, India views the May conflict not as an aberration to be avoided but as a template to be refined. Pakistan's military, meanwhile, has vowed that its response will be "swift, decisive, and destructive." These dueling commitments to escalation dominance leave little room for the restraint that has, until now, prevented catastrophic conflict between South Asia's nuclear-armed rivals.
