In late October 2025, at least half a dozen executives from India's top arms manufacturers traveled to Moscow for rare discussions on joint ventures with Russian defense firms, three people familiar with the matter told Reuters. The October 29–30 meetings—the first such business delegation since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine—covered potential co-production of spare parts for MiG-29 fighter jets, air-defense systems, and other Russian-origin platforms that form the backbone of India's military inventory.
The timing was deliberate: talks preceded the December 4–5 Putin-Modi summit, where both leaders publicly committed to reorienting their partnership toward "joint research and development, co-development and co-production of advanced defence technology" to support India's self-reliance drive. Yet the swift denials from named participants—spokespeople for Adani Defence and Bharat Forge both said their executives did not attend—underscore the acute political sensitivity surrounding any visible deepening of Russia defense ties amid Western sanctions pressure.
The co-production gambit
Sources told Reuters the business delegation, led by Defence Production Secretary Sanjeev Kumar, included representatives linked to Tata Sons, Larsen & Toubro, state-owned Bharat Electronics, and startups focused on drones and AI for military applications. Discussion topics centered on establishing production units inside India to manufacture spares for Russian-origin equipment, with the potential to export finished components back to Russia and third countries.
This represents a mode shift. India has historically procured Russian platforms and licensed some production—T-90 tanks, Su-30MKI fighters, and AK-203 rifles are assembled domestically under technology-transfer agreements. But the Moscow talks focused on reversing the supply chain: localizing sustainment infrastructure for an installed base that accounts for roughly 36 percent of India's military inventory, according to Western diplomats cited by Reuters, while creating export capacity that could feed Russia's own war-driven demand.
Russian proposals reportedly included setting up production footprints on Indian soil, leveraging India's growing defense manufacturing ecosystem under the Make in India policy. For New Delhi, the calculus is industrial as much as strategic: insulating critical fleets—Su-30MKI air-superiority fighters, MiG-29 interceptors, S-400 air-defense batteries, and T-72/90 main battle tanks—from supply disruption while advancing domestic capacity in precision components and complex systems integration.
Members are reading: How India's co-production calculus intersects with Western sanctions enforcement and the hidden risks to technology-transfer partnerships.
Institutional precedents and what's new
India-Russia defense cooperation already rests on deep institutional foundations. The 2021–2031 Programme for Military Technical Cooperation and the Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) provide formal channels. Co-production is not new: the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile is a flagship joint venture; AK-203 rifles are manufactured via Indo-Russia Rifles Pvt. Ltd.; licensed production of T-90 tanks and Su-30MKI fighters has run for years; MiG-29 upgrades and S-400 deliveries continue under existing contracts.
What distinguishes the October talks is scope and timing. This was the first business-leaders' mission since 2022, signaling intent to expand co-production into spares, air-defense components, and potentially dual-use systems—with explicit discussion of export back to Russia. It moves beyond licensed assembly toward integrated supply chains that could serve both markets, a step-change in ambition that aligns with global defense industry trends toward localized capacity but carries higher sanctions risk.
What to watch
The gap between summit-level commitments and actual memoranda of understanding will be telling. Watch for announcements of production facilities, export licenses, or technology-transfer agreements in coming months. Equally important: Western reactions. Any move by the U.S. Treasury or European authorities to designate Indian entities for sanctions violations would force New Delhi to choose between co-production ambitions and access to Western defense ecosystems—a choice it has so far avoided by keeping Russia ties in legacy channels.
The denials from named firms suggest that, for now, Indian industry is more cautious than Indian strategists. Until the sanctions exposure calculus shifts—or until spares shortages force the issue—co-production may remain more talking point than production line. India's balancing act continues, but the Moscow meetings show the tightrope is getting narrower.
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