An analyst at Denmark's Security and Intelligence Service (PET) said on 7 October that Russia has begun carrying out sabotage operations against Danish companies that supply Ukraine. Josefine Christensen spoke at a homeland security conference in Copenhagen. PET did not name the companies, and Crisis.Zone has not independently verified her account.
Christensen said PET detected extensive Russian planning in spring 2026, but very few operations were carried out. From early summer, she said, Russia executed "significantly more". She described the recruits as untrained proxies, including homeless people and people with drug addictions, approached through Telegram (a messaging platform) and other social media. The Russian embassy in Copenhagen denied that Russia carries out sabotage operations in Europe, Reuters reported.
What is confirmed and what is claimed
Confirmed: Christensen made these remarks on 7 October. Everything about the operations themselves is PET's account. No incident has been publicly tied to a named company, perpetrator or date.
According to Christensen, recruits start with low-threshold tasks such as reconnaissance and photography, then progress to sabotage. She said Russian intelligence concluded that earlier broad disruption "did not have the effect of deterring" Western NATO states from supporting Ukraine. That is her description of Russian reasoning, not a Russian statement. She also cited an April 2026 Russian defence ministry list naming European drone and drone component manufacturers as potential military targets. Crisis.Zone has not seen the document. On 30 September, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said weapons factories in European countries producing arms for Ukraine were "potential military targets".
Earlier incidents involved Denmark and its allies. The Danish Armed Forces reported that a Russian frigate fired flares at a Danish military helicopter in September. Germany blamed Russia for the Leipzig airport drone attack, and a U.S. intelligence source told ABC News that the drone bore the hallmarks of devices typically employed by the GRU, Russian military intelligence. Russia's embassy rejected that accusation.
Observers are reading: how the proxy recruitment model maps onto the attribution and consensus gaps that shape NATO and EU responses.
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Open questions for Copenhagen
Christensen's account describes activity PET says is already under way, not a forecast. The details that would let it be tested, such as targets, dates and attribution, have not been made public. Whether allied institutions adapt to a deniable, proxy-based model should become clearer in the next statements from Copenhagen, Brussels and NATO.
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