The Trump administration on Wednesday launched what it characterizes as a transformative phase in Gaza's post-war trajectory, announcing the establishment of a technocratic Palestinian body to administer the devastated territory. US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff declared the creation of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a 15-member appointed body headed by former Palestinian Authority official Ali Shaath, as the centerpiece of "Phase Two" of President Trump's 20-point Gaza plan. The announcement marks a procedural shift from ceasefire management to the more ambitious domains of governance, demilitarization, and reconstruction.
Yet beneath the administrative architecture lies a fundamental tension that has undermined every previous attempt to resolve Gaza's governance crisis: the plan attempts to impose an apolitical, technocratic solution onto a conflict driven by irreconcilable political and security imperatives. The NCAG possesses neither indigenous legitimacy nor coercive capacity, while the key parties—Israel, Hamas, and regional stakeholders—remain locked in competing visions of what Gaza's future should represent. The blueprint is elegant; the implementation environment is hostile.
The sovereignty question no committee can answer
The NCAG faces an immediate structural paradox. Governance, at its core, requires the capacity to enforce decisions, arbitrate disputes, and maintain order—functions that rest on a monopoly of legitimate force. The committee of technocrats unveiled Wednesday commands none of these instruments. It is an administrative shell in a territory where armed groups have been the arbiters of power for nearly two decades.
The plan acknowledges this vacuum by proposing an International Stabilization Force (ISF), but the force remains a conceptual placeholder rather than an operational reality. Its composition is undecided, its mandate undefined, and its willingness to confront Hamas uncertain. The distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is not semantic—it determines whether the ISF will merely monitor a fragile status quo or actively disarm resistant factions. European and Arab states have historically proven reluctant to commit troops to what would amount to combat operations on Israel's behalf, particularly in Gaza's dense urban terrain.
This leaves the NCAG governing by permission rather than authority. Hamas has offered nominal support for the committee, likely calculating that overt opposition would cast it as a spoiler. But acquiescence is not subordination. Without credible enforcement mechanisms, the technocrats in Gaza City will administer only what armed factions allow them to administer.
Members are reading: Why the plan's sequencing inverts the logic demanded by its key stakeholders, creating a circular dependency with no exit.
Legitimacy by appointment, authority by consent
The NCAG's composition reveals another vulnerability. The committee is appointed, not elected, with members reportedly vetted by multiple external parties including Israel, Egypt, and the United States. While this ensures alignment with international preferences, it fundamentally compromises the body's claim to represent Palestinian interests independently.
Ali Shaath brings technocratic credentials but limited grassroots authority in Gaza, where Hamas has governed since 2007 and where the Palestinian Authority is viewed with deep skepticism. The committee's effectiveness depends on its ability to command compliance from a population that has endured 16 months of devastating conflict and may view yet another externally-imposed administrative structure with cynicism.
The involvement of a "Board of Peace" chaired by President Trump and including Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar compounds this legitimacy challenge. Each actor brings divergent interests: Egypt prioritizes border security and Hamas containment, Turkey seeks regional influence and positioning as a champion of Palestinian rights, Washington wants a foreign policy achievement that marginalizes armed resistance, and Israel demands security guarantees that may be incompatible with Palestinian sovereignty aspirations. These competing agendas are likely to produce compromise paralysis rather than coherent governance.
Strategic ambition meets tactical reality
The Trump administration's Gaza plan represents the most detailed international governance blueprint for the territory since the Oslo Accords. Its ambition is undeniable, and its recognition that humanitarian relief alone cannot resolve Gaza's crisis is strategically sound. The establishment of technocratic governance structures could, in theory, provide administrative continuity that previous frameworks lacked.
Yet the plan's structural vulnerabilities suggest it may join the long list of well-intentioned frameworks that collapsed upon contact with Gaza's political geography. Without resolving the disarmament question, establishing credible security enforcement, or securing genuine Palestinian buy-in, Phase Two risks becoming an expensive exercise in international administration—governance by external committee rather than indigenous authority. The blueprint is coherent. The implementation prerequisites remain absent. And in Gaza, the gap between planning and reality has historically been measured in failed frameworks and dashed expectations.
Subscribe to our free newsletter to unlock direct links to all sources used in this article.
We believe you deserve to verify everything we write. That's why we meticulously document every source.
