Myanmar junta nears completion of contested election as military-backed party secures majority

Myanmar's military junta concluded the final round of its general election, with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing rejecting foreign criticism as the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) secured a commanding majority across previous voting rounds. The election proceeded despite active civil war in multiple regions and a coordinated opposition boycott led by the National Unity Government and ethnic resistance organizations.

The outcome was never in doubt. Combined with the 25 percent of parliamentary seats constitutionally reserved for military appointees, the USDP's performance positions Min Aung Hlaing to transition from junta chief to president through a nominally civilian government structure. This conversion represents not a democratic opening, but a strategic recalibration aimed at regional economic actors increasingly wary of engaging with a military council governing a collapsing state.

The economics of manufactured consent

The election's primary function extends beyond domestic political theater. Myanmar's formal economy contracted sharply following the 2021 coup, with foreign direct investment plummeting and the kyat losing over 60 percent of its value against the dollar. The junta's war against armed resistance groups—now controlling significant territory across Shan, Kachin, Kayah, and Kayin states—represents a substantial drain on national resources. The Myanmar military's official budget for fiscal year 2023-24 increased by 51 percent to approximately $2.7 billion, accounting for 30 percent of government spending, with the military also maintaining significant off-budget funding sources through military-owned conglomerates.

A 'civilian' government, however superficial, offers the junta a critical institutional vehicle for economic re-engagement. Regional powers including China, Thailand, and India maintain pragmatic interest in Myanmar's stability and economic connectivity, but face domestic and limited international pressure when dealing directly with a military regime under Western sanctions. The election provides a veneer of legitimacy that allows these neighbors to frame future economic arrangements as cooperation with an elected government rather than direct support for military rule.

The strategic calculus targets specific economic lifelines. China's Belt and Road projects in Kyaukphyu port and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor remain stalled amid conflict. Thailand seeks to finalize energy pipeline agreements and border economic zone development. India's Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project requires stable governance frameworks. Each of these multibillion-dollar initiatives demands counterparties with at least performative legitimacy—precisely what a USDP-led parliament offers.

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Regional fractures and institutional constraints

International response split along predictable fault lines. The United States and European Union issued statements condemning the election as illegitimate, with the U.S. Treasury maintaining targeted sanctions on military-linked economic entities. These denunciations carry limited practical weight in Naypyidaw, where the junta has already factored Western isolation into its strategic planning.

More significant is the response from immediate neighbors. China and Russia offered tacit support through congratulatory statements emphasizing Myanmar's sovereignty. ASEAN, however, refused to certify the results—a position that reflects not organizational weakness but the bloc's institutional DNA. ASEAN's consensus-based framework prevents collective recognition when member states hold divergent interests. Maritime Southeast Asian democracies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines) face domestic pressure against normalizing military rule, while mainland neighbors (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia) prioritize border stability and economic opportunity.

This split creates space for bilateral economic arrangements that bypass multilateral frameworks. Thailand has already signaled willingness to engage a post-election government on energy and border trade. China's Foreign Ministry statements emphasized "respecting Myanmar's sovereignty" while avoiding explicit endorsement—language that maintains flexibility for project-specific engagement with whatever governance structure emerges.

Embedding conflict under civilian cover

The election will not resolve Myanmar's civil war or restore genuine political legitimacy. Instead, it creates a dangerous new equilibrium where regional economic interests normalize engagement with a regime actively bombing civilian populations and displacing hundreds of thousands. The USDP government Min Aung Hlaing will likely lead offers neighbors a transactional partner with parliamentary credentials, while the underlying state failure continues.

This manufactured legitimacy remains fundamentally fragile. The resistance forces controlling territory across northern and eastern Myanmar show no indication of recognizing a junta-installed government. The election's exclusion of conflict-affected populations and the systematic repression required to achieve even the reported turnout figures undermine any claim to popular mandate. What emerges is not a resolution, but an institutionalized facade that allows economic actors to pursue narrow interests while Myanmar's political crisis deepens beneath a thin civilian veneer.