- Iran's Axis of Resistance remained silent during Gaza ceasefire, exposing network collapse after Israeli military campaign
- Hezbollah degraded from regional deterrent to rebuilding liability, losing 60% rocket arsenal and key leadership infrastructure
- Tehran faces existential choice between costly proxy reconstruction or pursuing nuclear weapons despite catastrophic risks
The October 8, 2025 ceasefire in Gaza marked a pivotal moment not just for Palestinians and Israelis, but for the entire architecture of Middle Eastern power. As mediators brokered the fragile truce—primarily through U.S. intervention—a deafening silence echoed across the region. Iran's vaunted "Axis of Resistance," the network of proxy militias that Tehran had spent four decades and billions of dollars cultivating, remained conspicuously quiet. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Iraqi Shiite militias, and Yemen's Houthis—groups that had long served as Iran's sword and shield—issued only muted responses or stayed entirely on the sidelines.
This silence speaks volumes about the profound transformation underway in Middle Eastern geopolitics. The ceasefire didn't just pause hostilities in Gaza; it exposed the hollowing out of Iran's regional influence and raised a fundamental question: Has Tehran's proxy strategy—the cornerstone of its regional power for generations—finally collapsed under the weight of Israeli military pressure and its own strategic contradictions?
The proxy network that wasn't there
For more than four decades, Iran built an alliance of proxy forces across the Middle East as part of what it called the "Axis of Resistance." This network was designed to project power, repel U.S. and Israeli influence, and insulate Tehran from direct confrontation. According to the Stimson Center, Iran historically employed at least four main fronts: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. The goal was to compel Israel to defend on multiple fronts simultaneously, reducing its ability to focus on Iranian nuclear or military capabilities.
Yet when Israel and Hamas agreed to the Gaza ceasefire in October 2025, these proxies were nowhere to be found in any meaningful capacity. The contrast with earlier periods couldn't be starker. During previous conflicts, Iran's proxies would have launched coordinated attacks, fired rockets across borders, and created multiple crisis points to divide Israeli attention and resources.
Hezbollah: From deterrent to liability
Hezbollah, long considered Iran's most powerful proxy, has been rendered largely irrelevant. The Lebanese Shiite militia that once boasted over 130,000 rockets and missiles—making it the world's most heavily armed non-state actor according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies—has been decimated by Israeli military operations.
The group's long-serving leader Hassan Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli precision strike, marking a turning point in the organization's trajectory. In a recent interview, Hezbollah's current leader Naim Qassem appeared as a Lebanese statesman rather than an Iranian proxy, according to the Washington Post. Notably, no Iranian insignia adorned his office, and no portrait of Ayatollah Khamenei was displayed on his walls—a symbolic break from the past.
Hezbollah's military supplies and funding lines have been severely stressed. With Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria toppled in late 2024 and smuggling routes through Syria disrupted, the group's logistical network has shrunk considerably. Iran had relied on the Assad regime since the 1980s to enable the shipment of weapons, technology, and people to Hezbollah in Lebanon through Syria. The loss of these supply lines has reduced Iran to attempting to send cash to Hezbollah using aircraft and very small numbers of weapons overland, with the Lebanese government—empowered by Hezbollah's weakness—moving for the first time to stop these shipments.
Israel's three-month military campaign badly degraded Hezbollah and forced the group into what analysts described as a "humiliating ceasefire" under UN Resolution 1701 that could even require Hezbollah's disarmament. One senior analyst noted that Hezbollah has been "reduced in such a way that it will take years to rebuild to the point that it can provide deterrence for Iran," transforming it from a strategic asset into a "strategic liability."
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Hamas: A shadow of its former self
Hamas, the Palestinian militant group in Gaza that initiated the October 7, 2023 attacks, is similarly diminished. After nearly two years of war with Israel, much of Gaza lies in ruins, and many of Hamas' senior leaders are dead. Both senior leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar were killed, with the other known figure, Khaled Mashal, sitting in Qatar. It remains unknown how strong Hamas' on-ground leadership is or their capacity to help Iran wage war against Israel.
The military infrastructure that the group relied upon—tunnels, command centers, and rocket factories—has been systematically dismantled. According to Gaza's Health Ministry, the war has killed over 67,000 Palestinians (though the ministry doesn't differentiate between civilians and combatants but says around half the dead are women and children). The physical and organizational devastation has rendered Hamas unable to function as an effective military force, let alone as a reliable Iranian proxy.Although Hamas initiated the October 7, 2023 attacks that plummeted the Middle East into chaos, Iran's response has been notably restrained. Tehran offered political support and condemned Israel, but its military backing was limited. Iranian state media has sought to describe the Gaza ceasefire as a victory for Hamas, despite the war destroying the Gaza Strip—a narrative that rings hollow given the scale of destruction and Hamas's inability to achieve its stated objectives.
Iraq's militias: From warriors to businessmen
In Iraq, a patchwork of Iranian-aligned Shiite militias has long harassed U.S. troops, guarded Iranian interests, and amplified Tehran's influence in Baghdad. These groups, including Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, were instrumental in fighting ISIS and became institutionalized into Iraq's security apparatus as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).However, since January 2025, following Israel's strikes on Iranian soil, the Shiite militias have issued only muted condemnations. Only Kataeb Hezbollah made a vague threat to act, and only if the U.S. joins Israel in attacking Iran. This represents a dramatic shift from their earlier behavior, when these groups launched over 170 attacks against U.S. military bases in Iraq and Syria.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani, a moderate with ties to both Tehran and Washington, has quietly urged militia commanders to stay out of the conflict. Sudani, who has advocated for a ceasefire in Gaza, has simultaneously worked to halt the Islamic Resistance of Iraq's attacks against U.S. troops. On January 30, 2025, Kataib Hezbollah released a statement that it would suspend military operations to avoid embarrassing the Iraqi government—a decision that came after Sudani's intervention but also likely under pressure from leaders in Tehran, who want to prevent their proxies from provoking a direct war between Iran and the U.S.The episode underscores the challenge of controlling various armed groups in Iraq and suggests that none of these groups has a monopoly on state power. More significantly, it reveals that many of these militias have evolved from ideological warriors into political and economic actors with domestic interests that sometimes conflict with Iran's regional agenda.
Iran has been effectively extracting resources from Iraq's economy to subsidize its own needs and fund proxies. As Euronews reports, "Iran's Revolutionary Guard and its Quds Force do in Iraq what the East India Company once did in India—plundering wealth to finance an empire." Iran benefits from schemes like smuggling its sanctioned oil via Iraq (disguised as Iraqi oil) and having militias steal Iraqi oil or win inflated contracts. Iraqi militias even secured $3 billion annually from Iraq's state budget (officially to pay 250,000 fighters in the PMF), with much of that money siphoned to activities benefiting Tehran's agenda rather than Iraq's security.
However, these militias are now in competition with one another domestically ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi elections and are reluctant to be drawn into the Iran-Israel conflict. They could still attack the United States in the event that the U.S. enters the conflict—many Iraqi groups made their entry into the war contingent on U.S. intervention. But their primary focus has shifted from regional resistance to domestic political positioning and economic gain.
The Houthis: Waiting in the wings
Yemen's Houthis have been the most visibly active Iranian ally in recent months, firing several missiles at Israel and maintaining their anti-American and anti-Israel rhetoric. The group drew Iranian support as a means to pressure Saudi Arabia through cross-border missiles and the threat to Red Sea shipping lanes.
However, even the Houthis have tapered off their activities. After several of their missile batteries were destroyed in U.S. airstrikes in March and April 2025, the group has been cautious. While Houthi leadership maintains close coordination with Tehran, its public positioning is notably more independent than in the past.
The Houthis' position may be shifting due to broader regional dynamics. A regional détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023, and ongoing peace talks in Yemen, have reduced Houthi-Saudi hostilities. As one analysis suggested, by 2025 Iran faces the "collapse of key proxies…potentially the Houthis in Yemen." Even if the Houthis remain in control of northern Yemen, a stable peace will likely diminish Iran's ability to use them as an active proxy against Riyadh, removing yet another piece of its strategic depth in the Arabian Peninsula.The Houthis broke a period of tranquility in the Red Sea last week by attacking two commercial vessels navigating this vital route, according to reports. A recent strike on a Greek-owned vessel resulted in four crew members' deaths, injuries to several others, and left 11 individuals missing, as reported by the European Union naval operation Aspides. These attacks, which resulted in the sinking of two vessels, signify an escalation in aggression and are the first recorded incidents this year following a prolonged period of calm in this busy maritime route.
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The strategic implications of proxy failure
The weakening or dissolution of Iran's proxy alliances represents a watershed event for the Islamic Republic. The collapse of Tehran's "Axis of Resistance" has sharply reduced Iran's strategic reach, leaving it militarily vulnerable and largely isolated in a hostile neighborhood.
Without the buffer of proxy forces, Iran has been exposed to direct strikes by its adversaries—a fact evidenced by Israeli attacks on Iranian soil once Hezbollah and Hamas were neutralized. The deterrence equation that long protected Iran is being upended. As one analysis noted, Israel "effectively neutralized Iran's non-state actors," which "exposed [Iran] to direct attack"—something Iran had long sought to avoid.
Indeed, in late 2024, Iran itself launched direct missile and drone strikes against Israel (on April 13 and October 1, 2024), a stark departure from its usual practice of acting through proxies. These direct attacks, likely a response to having no proxies left to do the job, ended up backfiring: they caused minimal damage thanks to U.S. and Israeli air defenses, and invited punishing Israeli retaliation. Israeli strikes "destroyed significant portions of Iran's air defenses and ballistic missile production facilities" in response.
The June 2025 war: Iran stands alone
The most dramatic demonstration of Iran's isolation came during the 12-day war in June 2025. On June 13, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, a massive air campaign targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, missile sites, and military leadership. The operation, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described as necessary to "roll back the Iranian threat to Israel's very survival," represented the culmination of decades of Israeli strategic planning.
Iran retaliated with waves of missiles and drones, but the response was notably unilateral. The so-called "Axis of Resistance" remained largely silent. As one analysis concluded, "The lack of a meaningful response from the so-called 'Axis of Resistance' to the Israel-Iran war reveals how exhausted it is after months of fighting the United States and Israel.
Hezbollah and Hamas were probably unable to assist. The Houthis and Iraqi militias appeared largely unwilling. These groups remain capable of threatening U.S. interests in the Middle East, but the extent to which they remained uninvolved reflects an unraveling of the Iranian regional militia network, which has long been considered the primary Iranian means of retaliating against adversary attacks.
On June 21, the United States directly intervened in the conflict, attacking three Iranian nuclear sites in Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz with bunker-buster bombs. This marked the first time a U.S. president attacked another country's nuclear program and the first time the U.S. explicitly joined Israel in an attack on an adversary. Iran retaliated on June 23, launching a missile attack on U.S. forces stationed at the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, with no casualties reported.
A ceasefire was announced on June 24, 2025, after 12 days of combat. Despite its volatile beginnings and initial violations by both Iran and Israel, the ceasefire held, in part due to President Trump's continued direct intervention with Netanyahu. The conflict resulted in at least 234 deaths, mostly civilians, and massive physical destruction on both sides.
Iran's dilemma: Nuclear weapons or proxy reconstruction?
The critical question now is how Iran will attempt to re-establish deterrence. Will it rebuild its weakened militias, or will it pursue nuclear weapons development, knowing this could provoke devastating strikes from the U.S. and Israel? Both options are fraught with risks.For over four decades, Iran has invested heavily in proxy militias, beginning with Hezbollah in the early 1980s and expanding to include groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. These militias were instrumental in projecting Iranian influence across the region and deterring attacks on the regime. At its height, Iran's proxy network posed threats to both Israel and Saudi Arabia while retaining the capacity to disrupt global trade routes.
Despite recent setbacks, Iran retains some ability to destabilize the region, particularly in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Reports indicate Iran is attempting to rearm proxy groups, with suspected Iran-backed factions escalating assaults on Western allies in Iraq and undermining oil production in Kurdish-controlled areas. According to Aziz Ahmad, an official with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), five oil fields, including two operated by U.S. companies, were targeted after a series of drone strikes by "criminal militias.
Iran's efforts to rearm Hezbollah have persisted over the past year. The new Syrian administration, which staunchly opposes Iran, has intercepted multiple shipments of weapons intended for Lebanon. Last month, the Syrian Interior Ministry reported thwarting an attempt to smuggle anti-tank Kornet missiles—the same type utilized by Hezbollah against Israeli tanks in southern Lebanon. The Syrian police revealed that these weapons were concealed in a truck carrying vegetables in the Homs region, which borders Lebanon.
While rebuilding its militias remains a likely priority, Iran faces pressure to pursue a nuclear weapons program as an alternative means for regime survival. However, this strategy carries immense risks. Developing nuclear weapons would almost certainly trigger a massive military response from the U.S. and Israel, threatening the regime's existence. It could also shift power within Iran's leadership, empowering the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps at the expense of the clerical establishment—a dynamic Iranian leaders have historically sought to avoid, fearing a potential coup.
The ideological trap: Khamenei's unwavering commitment
Iran's strategic decisions are deeply influenced by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, its 86-year-old supreme leader. Khamenei remains committed to the revolutionary ideology of Khomeinism, which frames the regime's legitimacy around its opposition to Israel and the U.S. Karim Sadjadpour, a leading scholar on Iran, notes that Khamenei's speeches frequently blame Israel for global, regional, and even national problems, reflecting an obsessive focus on the Jewish state.
Khamenei's ideological rigidity leaves little room for self-correction. The regime's revolutionary ethos—centered on resistance against "oppression" and the defeat of "arrogance"—serves as the glue holding its leadership together. It constitutes the regime's framework of solidarity or asabiyya—a concept developed by the 14th-century Arab scholar Ibn Khaldun. Abandoning this ideology would risk unraveling the regime itself.
Ali Akbar Velayati, an adviser to Khamenei, wrote on X: "The start of the ceasefire in Gaza may be the behind-the-scenes end of the ceasefire somewhere else!" This statement, referencing Hezbollah, Yemen's Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, and Iraq, suggests that Iranian leadership views the Gaza ceasefire not as an opportunity for regional de-escalation but as a potential catalyst for renewed conflict elsewhere.
With no apparent Gorbachev-like figure in Tehran to lead a reformist shift, the likelihood of significant change under Khamenei is minimal. A more plausible scenario involves a military takeover led by the IRGC following Khamenei's eventual death. However, even this outcome is unlikely to produce a significant departure from the regime's current policies.
Regional realignment and the future of Middle Eastern security
The weakening of Iran's proxy network has created space for regional realignment. The October 8, 2025 Gaza ceasefire prompted regional reassessments, with Iranian leadership indicating that the ceasefire could influence the de-escalation of conflicts in other areas where Iran has influence, such as Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. However, Iran notably declined an Egyptian invitation to attend a regional peace summit, citing continuing U.S. sanctions and hostilities against Tehran.
Iranian state media and dissenting voices within Iran have offered rare critical assessments of Iran's involvement in the Gaza conflict, describing their intervention as strategically costly and a setback to Tehran's longstanding proxy-based regional policies aimed at Israel. This internal debate reflects growing recognition that the proxy strategy has failed to achieve its objectives while imposing significant costs on Iran's economy and international standing.
The aftermath of the June 2025 Israel-Iran conflict continues to shape geopolitical dynamics. Israel's more assertive posture since the Hamas attacks of October 2023, supported by the Trump administration's policies, culminated in the June strikes on Iranian targets. Meanwhile, European nations focus on preventing further escalation following this pivotal confrontation.
For Iraq specifically, the crisis fueled by regional tensions has resulted in alarming levels of instability. Although Iraqi armed groups halted attacks on U.S. troops after their peak in February 2025, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed drone attacks on Israeli targets and Iran reportedly launched drone strikes on Israel from Iraqi territory during the April 2024 escalation. This dynamic threatens the relative stability Iraq has enjoyed over the past few years and the country's fledgling role as a regional mediator.
Iraq's ability to mediate between Iran and the rest of the region has become a critical asset in its foreign policy and has been integral to greater stability and decreased polarization in Iraq over recent years. Western powers supported this approach—France, for instance, was a key partner in supporting the Baghdad conference. However, the ripple effects of regional conflict gravely threaten this delicate balancing act.
Conclusion: The end of an era
The silence of Iran's proxies during the Gaza ceasefire marks more than a tactical pause—it signals the potential end of a strategic era. For four decades, Iran's network of allied militias served as the cornerstone of its regional influence, allowing Tehran to project power, deter adversaries, and avoid direct military confrontation. That model now lies in ruins, dismantled by sustained Israeli military pressure, internal contradictions, and the evolving priorities of the proxy groups themselves.
The implications extend far beyond the immediate military balance. Iran's diminished regional influence creates both opportunities and dangers. On one hand, the weakening of groups like Hezbollah and Hamas reduces immediate threats to Israeli security and creates space for diplomatic initiatives, including potential progress on Palestinian statehood—a development that would further undercut Iran's ability to exploit the Palestinian cause for regional influence.
On the other hand, a cornered Iran may prove more dangerous than an ascendant one. The regime faces a stark choice: accept diminished regional status and focus on domestic survival, or pursue nuclear weapons as a last-resort deterrent. The latter option would almost certainly trigger military confrontation with Israel and potentially the United States, with catastrophic consequences for the region and beyond.
The next 12 months will be critical. Iran must decide whether to invest scarce resources in rebuilding its proxy network—a process that could take years and may never restore the deterrence value these groups once provided—or to accelerate its nuclear program despite the existential risks. Meanwhile, the international community, particularly European powers with experience in Iranian nuclear diplomacy, must decide whether to pursue renewed negotiations or prepare for a more confrontational approach.What seems certain is that the Middle East of 2026 will look fundamentally different from the region of 2023. The "Axis of Resistance" that dominated regional security calculations for decades has been exposed as far more fragile than its architects imagined. Whether this creates an opportunity for lasting peace or merely sets the stage for more dangerous forms of conflict will depend on choices made in Tehran, Jerusalem, Washington, and capitals across the region in the critical months ahead.
