Exiled Assad-era rivals compete from Moscow to mobilize Syria's coast

Two exiled Assad-era heavyweights are waging competing campaigns from Moscow to build fighting forces along Syria's Alawite-majority coast, according to a Reuters investigation that reveals a multimillion-dollar rivalry playing out in hotel suites, encrypted messaging, and a network of subterranean command rooms left over from the dictatorship's final days. Former military intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Kamal Hassan and billionaire cousin Rami Makhlouf are each spending heavily to recruit from a traumatized Alawite community—Hassan promising restoration through force, Makhlouf wrapping himself in messianic narrative—while vying for control of 14 underground facilities stocked with weapons, communications gear, and solar power.

The new Syrian government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa has responded by deploying Khaled al-Ahmad, an Alawite former Assad insider and childhood friend of the president, to steer ex-soldiers and civilians away from the exiles' orbit. The contest reveals less about imminent revolt than about fractured elite competition weaponizing sectarian identity amid Syria's uncertain transition—and the state's measured strategy to deny oxygen to spoilers who lack both grassroots legitimacy and Russian sponsorship.

The Moscow money machine and its meager payroll

Hassan operates from a villa outside Moscow, sending voice messages to former commanders and recruiting ex-military-intelligence hackers; Syrian government datasets subsequently appeared for sale on the dark web, Reuters found. Internal documents cited by the investigation claim Hassan controls approximately 12,000 fighters, though Reuters could not verify mobilization. His camp has spent roughly $1.5 million since March, including cash support to officers and funding a charity front—"Development of Western Syria"—to build influence in coastal towns.

Makhlouf, living on a private hotel floor in Moscow, has constructed a more elaborate apparatus. Documents reviewed by Reuters claim an 80-battalion structure spanning Homs, Hama, Tartous, and Latakia, with at least $6 million spent on salaries for what he asserts are 54,000 personnel. According to commanders, fighters receive meager pay and some reportedly take money from both camps, though Reuters could not confirm these figures or the specific operational plans. Makhlouf brands himself the divinely-appointed "Coast Boy," a messianic persona promising apocalyptic return—a narrative aimed at disaffected Alawites but received with skepticism by many who suffered under Assad's rule and distrust exiled elites.

Financing networks span Russia, Lebanon, and the UAE, according to aides and documents cited by Reuters. The modest stipends and double-dipping suggest the plotters are purchasing symbolic allegiance rather than mobilizing cohesive units. Without sustained cash flow or command coherence, recruitment lists function more as political signaling than as a ready insurgent order of battle.

The underground prize: command rooms as leverage, not launchpad

At the heart of the rivalry lies a network of 14 underground command rooms built during Assad's final phase, scattered along roughly 180 kilometers of coastline. Photos reviewed by Reuters show crates of AK-47s, ammunition, grenades, computers, tablets, and walkie-talkies. The facilities retain solar power, internet connectivity, GPS, and radio systems. Tartous governor Ahmed al-Shami confirmed the network's existence but described it as weakened and assessed the plotters' capabilities as limited.

The command rooms function less as turnkey insurgent headquarters than as symbolic leverage—"Treasure Island" in the words of one analyst familiar with the contest. Physical control without state tolerance, local consent, and logistical sustainability yields little operational value. The new government has focused on securing or monitoring access points, while al-Ahmad's mission centers on persuading former officers and community leaders that cooperation with Damascus offers more safety and economic prospect than exile-directed schemes.

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Outlook: sabotage plausible, mass revolt unlikely

Targeted violence and sabotage remain plausible near-term risks. Small cells with access to cached weapons can harass government installations, assassinate activists, or stage spectacle attacks to signal exile relevance. Yet a coordinated coastal uprising capable of challenging state control appears unlikely absent fundamental shifts: normalization of sustained cash flow to fighters, explicit Kremlin sponsorship, or major security missteps by Damascus that alienate Alawite communities en masse.

The plotters' rivalry—Hassan's coercive pedigree versus Makhlouf's messianic theatrics—fragments rather than consolidates opposition. Their meager payrolls and competing claims to the command-room network suggest elite jockeying for post-Assad relevance rather than operational insurgency. As Syria's new government consolidates amid contested peripheries, the coastal contest will test whether al-Ahmad's insider diplomacy and selective enforcement can peel enough former officers and civilians away from exile patronage to render the underground rooms and recruitment lists irrelevant. For now, the calculus favors the state—but the infrastructure of potential revolt remains in place, awaiting shifts in external sponsorship or internal governance failure to activate.