Ethiopia Accuses Eritrea of War Prep & Proxy Support

• Ethiopia formally accuses Eritrea of war preparation and arming Amhara/TPLF groups in unprecedented UN complaint
• Alleged Eritrea-Egypt axis threatens Ethiopia on Nile waters and Red Sea access through coordinated destabilization
• 780,000 refugees face deeper hunger as violence kills aid workers, weaponizes humanitarian corridors across region

The diplomatic temperature in the Horn of Africa rose sharply on October 8, 2025, when Ethiopia delivered a formal accusation to the UN Secretary-General that Eritrea is actively preparing for war. The letter alleges that Asmara is not only mobilizing for direct military confrontation but is also funding, arming, and directing armed groups operating inside Ethiopian territory—specifically in the volatile Amhara region and in collaboration with a hardline faction of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).

This unprecedented escalation comes as the region grapples with multiple overlapping crises. Over the past week, Ethiopia has raised increasingly urgent alarms about Eritrean militarization along their shared border. Meanwhile, human rights violations continue unabated in both Amhara and Tigray, where civilians face extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, and indiscriminate attacks from multiple armed actors. The UN's humanitarian operations hang by a thread—eight aid workers have been killed in Amhara since January alone, and the World Food Programme has been forced to slash refugee rations from 60% to 40% in 27 camps, affecting approximately 780,000 people.

As international mediators prepare for critical African Union Peace and Security Council sessions later this month, one question looms: Can the fragile 2022 peace agreement survive this new phase of confrontation, or is the Horn of Africa sliding toward a broader regional conflict that could destabilize an already precarious security landscape?

The anatomy of Ethiopia's accusation

Ethiopia's October 8 letter to the UN represents more than diplomatic posturing—it constitutes a formal allegation of state-sponsored destabilization with specific, grave charges. According to the complaint, Eritrea is engaged in three distinct but coordinated activities: direct military preparation for interstate war, material support for armed groups in Ethiopia's Amhara region, and strategic collaboration with the hardline TPLF faction led by Debretsion Gebremichael.

The accusation regarding Amhara is particularly significant. The region has experienced sustained violence throughout 2025, with Ethiopian federal forces and Fano militias locked in a brutal conflict that has claimed civilian lives through drone strikes, heavy artillery, and extrajudicial killings. Ethiopia's government now alleges that Eritrea is not merely observing this internal strife but actively fueling it through financial backing, weapons transfers, and operational direction of armed groups.

The TPLF dimension adds another layer of complexity. The faction led by Debretsion Gebremichael currently controls the government in Ethiopia's Tigray region, which shares a border with Eritrea. This group accuses Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government of failing to fully implement the November 2022 Pretoria Agreement that ended the devastating Tigray conflict. Ethiopia's letter suggests that Eritrea, which fought alongside Ethiopian forces during that war but was excluded from the peace deal, has now reversed course and formed an alliance with the very TPLF faction it previously opposed.

Eritrea's response: "Provocative sabre-rattling"

Eritrea wasted no time in rejecting Ethiopia's allegations. Information Minister Yemane Ghebremeskel dismissed the UN letter as "provocative sabre-rattling" and a "deceitful charade," denying any preparation for war or support for armed groups inside Ethiopia.

The Eritrean response, however, did not address the substance of Ethiopia's claims. Instead, it focused on what Asmara characterizes as Ethiopia's own threatening behavior—specifically, Prime Minister Abiy's pursuit of access to Red Sea ports. Eritrea has repeatedly warned that Ethiopia's push for sea access, particularly through the Somaliland agreement, threatens Eritrean sovereignty and represents an unacceptable encroachment on its territorial waters.

This exchange reflects a fundamental impasse: Ethiopia views Eritrea's military posture and alleged proxy support as aggressive destabilization, while Eritrea frames its actions as defensive responses to Ethiopian expansionism. Regional observers note rising military activity on both sides of the border, with troop movements and fortifications suggesting that both nations are preparing for potential conflict even as they trade accusations.

The African Union and regional bodies have thus far struggled to mediate effectively. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which played a crucial role in facilitating the Tigray peace agreement, faces limitations in addressing interstate tensions between two of its member states. Meanwhile, the African Union Peace and Security Council sessions scheduled for late October 2025 will need to address not just this specific Ethiopia-Eritrea tension but the broader pattern of conflict and counter-terrorism challenges across the Horn of Africa and Sahel regions.

The humanitarian toll: civilians caught in escalating violence

While diplomatic accusations fly between capitals, civilians across northern Ethiopia continue to bear the devastating consequences of ongoing violence. In the Amhara region, Ethiopian federal forces and Fano militias have committed a litany of human rights violations documented by international observers: extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, and the use of heavy artillery in populated areas. Recent drone strikes have reportedly killed dozens of civilians, contributing to a climate of terror that has already claimed eight humanitarian workers since January 2025.

The situation in Tigray remains equally dire, despite the 2022 peace agreement. Eritrean forces maintain a presence in occupied areas of the region, where they have perpetrated rape, abductions, and systematic pillaging. These violations occur against the backdrop of a broader humanitarian crisis: the World Food Programme's reduction of refugee rations from 60% to 40% in 27 camps now affects approximately 780,000 refugees, pushing already vulnerable populations toward acute hunger.

The UN's consideration of suspending relief operations in Amhara underscores the impossible position facing humanitarian actors. With eight aid workers killed and security conditions deteriorating, agencies must weigh the imperative to deliver life-saving assistance against the unacceptable risks to their personnel. Such a suspension would leave millions without access to food, medical care, and protection services at precisely the moment when needs are most acute.

Regional implications: a crisis that cannot be contained

The Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions exist within a broader regional context that magnifies their potential impact. The Horn of Africa is experiencing what some analysts describe as a "polycrisis"—multiple, interconnected emergencies that compound one another's effects and resist isolated solutions.

To Ethiopia's west, Sudan's devastating civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has created the world's largest displacement crisis, with over 12 million people forced from their homes since April 2023. The conflict has generated massive refugee flows into neighboring countries, including Ethiopia, which hosts approximately 43,000 Sudanese refugees despite facing its own internal challenges. The humanitarian strain is immense: Sudan faces famine conditions affecting millions, with more than 24 million people experiencing acute food insecurity.

To Ethiopia's east, Somalia continues to grapple with al-Shabaab insurgency and political fragmentation, while the Ethiopia-Somaliland port agreement has generated fierce opposition from Somalia's federal government and regional actors including Egypt and Eritrea. To the south, South Sudan faces renewed violence between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar, with approximately 300,000 people fleeing the country in 2025 alone.

This regional instability creates multiple pathways for crisis spillover. Weapons flow across porous borders, armed groups find sanctuary in neighboring territories, and displaced populations strain the resources of countries already struggling with their own challenges. The upcoming African Union Peace and Security Council sessions in late October 2025 will need to address not just individual conflicts but the systemic factors—including arms flows, external interference, and the breakdown of regional cooperation mechanisms—that perpetuate this cycle of violence.

The international response: engagement without impact

International efforts to address Horn of Africa crises have been characterized by concern without commensurate action. Recent discussions involving regional and international bodies indicate ongoing efforts to coordinate mediation and peace support mechanisms, particularly regarding Ethiopia and conflicts in the Sahel region. However, these efforts have yet to produce meaningful de-escalation or conflict resolution.

The challenge facing international actors is multifaceted. First, the sheer number and complexity of overlapping crises in the region overwhelm the capacity of even well-resourced mediation efforts. Second, external powers—including Gulf states, Egypt, and others—pursue competing interests that often undermine rather than support peace processes. Third, the parties to various conflicts, including Ethiopia and Eritrea, have demonstrated limited willingness to compromise on issues they view as existential.

The November 2022 Pretoria Agreement, which ended the Tigray conflict, offers both hope and caution. The agreement demonstrated that even seemingly intractable conflicts can be resolved through determined mediation, in that case led by the African Union with support from international partners. However, the incomplete implementation of that agreement—including the continued presence of Eritrean forces in Tigray and unresolved questions about disarmament and political reconciliation—shows that signing agreements is far easier than ensuring their full execution.

Ethiopia's October 8 accusation against Eritrea suggests that the fragile peace in northern Ethiopia may be unraveling. If Eritrea is indeed supporting armed groups in Amhara and collaborating with hardline TPLF factions, it indicates a deliberate strategy to maintain instability rather than consolidate peace. This would represent a fundamental challenge to the post-Pretoria order and could necessitate a new round of intensive international engagement to prevent a return to full-scale conflict.

Conclusion: the narrowing window for diplomatic intervention

Ethiopia's formal accusation that Eritrea is preparing for war while supporting armed groups inside Ethiopian territory marks a critical inflection point for Horn of Africa stability. The allegations, if substantiated, reveal a coordinated strategy of destabilization that threatens not just bilateral relations but the entire regional security architecture. With human rights violations continuing in Amhara and Tigray, humanitarian operations under severe strain, and multiple armed actors pursuing competing agendas, the conditions for broader conflict are alarmingly present.

The next six to twelve months will likely determine whether the region slides toward wider war or finds pathways toward de-escalation. The African Union Peace and Security Council sessions scheduled for late October 2025 represent a crucial opportunity for regional leadership, but success will require more than statements of concern. Effective intervention demands concrete measures: mechanisms to verify and halt cross-border arms flows, consequences for actors who violate peace agreements or support proxy forces, and sustained diplomatic engagement that addresses the underlying drivers of conflict—from Nile water disputes to Red Sea access to unresolved questions of political representation and accountability.

The international community's response will be equally decisive. The pattern of high-level concern followed by inadequate action has characterized too many Horn of Africa crises. Breaking this pattern requires not just humanitarian funding—though the World Food Programme's forced ration cuts demonstrate the urgent need for that—but political will to pressure all parties, including regional allies, toward genuine conflict resolution rather than tactical advantage.

The stakes extend far beyond Ethiopia and Eritrea: in a region where conflicts metastasize across borders and humanitarian emergencies compound one another, preventing this escalation may be the difference between containing a crisis and witnessing the Horn of Africa's descent into a generation-defining catastrophe.