Ahmed al-Sharaa's upcoming visit to the White House on November 10 represents more than diplomatic theater—it crystallizes a fundamental recalibration of U.S. regional strategy that would have been inconceivable eighteen months ago. The first Syrian leader ever to receive a presidential invitation to Washington arrives not as the representative of a stable ally, but as the pragmatic outcome of intersecting pressures: ISIS resurgence, Kurdish autonomy disputes, and great power competition with China over Syria's reconstruction. That the U.S. is rolling out the red carpet for someone who carried a $10 million bounty until recently reveals how drastically Washington's calculus has shifted since the Assad regime's collapse in December 2024.
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This rapprochement, initiated by Trump's May 2025 meeting with al-Sharaa in Saudi Arabia and accelerated by the lifting of most economic sanctions in June, represents a transactional approach to regional stability that sidesteps the thornier questions of governance, justice, and minority protection. Trump's characterization of al-Sharaa as a "young, attractive guy, tough guy" obscures the structural challenges his government faces: integrating Kurdish forces that control Syria's oil infrastructure, managing sectarian tensions among Alawites and Druze communities marginalized under both Assad and now potentially under new leadership, and navigating between Washington's expectations and Beijing's considerable economic footprint in Syrian reconstruction.
Can the U.S. successfully partner with a former al-Qaeda affiliate to counter ISIS without creating the conditions for future extremism, or does this visit signal a return to the expedient alliances that have historically destabilized the region?
The architecture of rapprochement
The path to al-Sharaa's White House invitation began not with diplomatic niceties but with brutal pragmatism. Following the Assad regime's unexpected collapse amid a convergence of Russian military overextension in Ukraine, Iranian resource depletion, and domestic fracturing along sectarian lines, the U.S. confronted a strategic vacuum. Washington faced three unappealing options: allow Russian or Iranian proxies to fill the void, empower Turkish-backed forces already hostile to Kurdish allies, or engage with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's successor government despite its problematic origins.
Trump's team chose the third path, calculating that al-Sharaa's transformation from Jabhat al-Nusra commander to state-builder offered a narrow window for influence before regional competitors consolidated their positions. The May 2025 Riyadh meeting—the first between American and Syrian leaders since Hafez al-Assad met with Bill Clinton in 2000—established the transactional framework: sanctions relief and legitimacy in exchange for counter-terrorism cooperation and acquiescence to U.S. regional priorities.
The June executive order lifting restrictions on Syrian banks and institutions, while maintaining sanctions on Assad-era figures, created economic breathing room. Yet this policy architecture contains an inherent contradiction. By prioritizing stability over accountability, Washington risks reproducing the very conditions that fueled Syria's civil war—concentrated power without institutional checks, economic reconstruction that benefits connected elites while ordinary Syrians remain displaced, and security cooperation that marginalizes communities perceived as threats.
Turkish sources, particularly Yeni Şafak and Hürriyet, have framed this engagement skeptically, noting that Washington's willingness to overlook al-Sharaa's past while maintaining pressure on Turkish operations against Kurdish forces exposes the selective application of counter-terrorism frameworks. Arabic-language outlets like *Al-Quds al-Arabi* have highlighted Syrian civil society concerns that this normalization occurs without mechanisms for transitional justice or accountability for war crimes committed by all sides.
Members are reading: How the U.S.-Syria counter-terrorism partnership risks reproducing the structural conditions that fuel extremism while marginalizing Kurdish and minority communities.
The reconstruction imperative and Chinese competition
Beyond security cooperation, economic reconstruction provides the material foundation for this diplomatic opening. Syria's infrastructure lies in ruins after fourteen years of conflict: housing stock destroyed, industrial capacity decimated, millions displaced. The World Bank estimates reconstruction costs exceed $400 billion—far beyond Damascus's capacity to mobilize domestically.
China has moved decisively to position itself as Syria's primary reconstruction partner. Since December 2024, Chinese firms have secured the majority of open tender contracts, focusing on energy infrastructure, telecommunications, and port development. The China-Syria Investment Fund, announced in March 2025, allocated $8 billion for initial projects, dwarfing potential Western investment. This economic footprint grants Beijing considerable influence over Syria's post-conflict trajectory, from physical infrastructure to digital architecture.
Washington's sanctions relief aims partly to create space for American firms to compete, but U.S. companies face significant disadvantages: security risks that Chinese state enterprises can absorb through government backing, absence of established relationships with Syrian counterparties, and ongoing congressional skepticism about normalizing economic ties with a government led by former jihadists. European allies have been even more reluctant, with France and Germany maintaining that sanctions relief must be conditioned on transitional justice mechanisms and constitutional reforms.
The White House visit will likely include discussions about American business interests taking precedence if Syria seeks full normalization with Washington. However, Damascus faces a delicate balancing act. Chinese investment comes with fewer political conditions and greater flexibility on governance issues, while U.S. engagement offers legitimacy and access to international financial institutions. Al-Sharaa's government cannot afford to alienate either benefactor, yet satisfying both may prove impossible as great power competition intensifies.
Members are reading: How reconstruction investments are proceeding along sectarian lines that risk institutionalizing fragmentation rather than rebuilding a unified Syrian state.
Regional implications and the Israeli dimension
Al-Sharaa's White House visit occurs within the broader context of Trump administration efforts to reshape Middle Eastern security architecture. The recent Gaza ceasefire agreement, while fragile, has created a moment of reduced active hostilities that Washington is attempting to leverage for wider regional agreements. Syria represents a crucial piece of this strategy.
U.S. officials have confirmed ongoing mediation efforts between Damascus and Tel Aviv aimed at a formal security agreement. Israel maintains significant interests in Syria's future: preventing Iranian military entrenchment, ensuring Hezbollah cannot rebuild logistics networks through Syrian territory, and maintaining the strategic advantage of controlling the Golan Heights. Al-Sharaa has publicly affirmed commitment to the 1974 disengagement agreement and expressed willingness to cooperate on counter-terrorism and chemical weapons elimination.
However, Syrian nationalist sentiment remains strongly opposed to normalization with Israel without addressing the Golan occupation. Al-Sharaa's government, still consolidating power and facing internal challenges to its legitimacy, cannot afford to be perceived as capitulating to Israeli interests. This creates a paradox: Washington wants a Syria-Israel security understanding as part of its regional architecture, but pushing too hard risks destabilizing the very Syrian government the U.S. is cultivating.
Regional actors are watching this balancing act carefully. Iran, significantly weakened by Israeli strikes and economic pressure but retaining networks within Syria, views U.S.-Syria normalization as a direct threat to its regional position. Tehran has limited capacity to prevent this rapprochement but maintains options for disruption through proxy forces. Hezbollah, despite its degradation in Lebanon, retains presence in Syria and could activate spoiler violence if Syrian-Israeli cooperation advances too far.
Turkey's position is perhaps most complex. Ankara supported rebel groups throughout Syria's civil war and maintains military presence in northern Syria. Turkish intelligence played a significant role in al-Sharaa's rise, and Turkey now expects influence over Syria's trajectory as compensation. Yet Ankara's absolute opposition to Kurdish autonomy conflicts with U.S. priorities, creating friction within a relationship Washington needs for counter-terrorism cooperation. The strategic pause approach that characterized the Gaza ceasefire may offer a model—accepting short-term contradictions while postponing resolution of fundamental conflicts—but this approach has inherent limits.
The governance question and path forward
The most significant dimension of al-Sharaa's White House visit may be what remains undiscussed: the internal governance of Syria itself. While security cooperation and economic reconstruction dominate the agenda, the fundamental questions of how Syria will be governed, how communities marginalized under Assad will be protected, and what mechanisms of accountability will exist for war crimes remain largely unaddressed.
Washington Institute assessments emphasize the need for pressing Damascus on governance, transitional justice, and minority protection. However, the operational logic of the U.S.-Syria relationship incentivizes avoiding these issues. Al-Sharaa's government has shown little appetite for genuine power-sharing arrangements, truth and reconciliation processes, or constitutional reforms that would limit executive authority. Washington's counter-terrorism imperatives and desire to counter Chinese influence create pressure to accept al-Sharaa's government as-is rather than conditioning cooperation on governance reforms that might destabilize it.
This approach mirrors patterns from previous U.S. engagements in the region: prioritizing stability and counter-terrorism cooperation over democratic governance, accepting authoritarian partners as long as they align with American strategic interests, and deferring accountability for past atrocities in favor of forward-looking relationships. The results of these previous engagements—from Egypt to Iraq to Afghanistan—suggest this model produces temporary tactical gains at the cost of long-term strategic failure.
Syrian civil society organizations, operating under constrained conditions, have voiced concerns that normalization without accountability will entrench impunity and reproduce power structures that led to conflict. International human rights organizations have documented that while the new government has not engaged in Assad-scale atrocities, it has systematically marginalized political opponents, restricted freedom of expression, and failed to establish independent judicial mechanisms.
The question becomes whether the U.S.-Syria relationship can evolve beyond transactional security cooperation toward supporting governance structures that address root causes of instability. Current trajectories suggest this evolution is unlikely. Trump administration officials speak of giving Syria "a chance at greatness," but operational decisions prioritize counter-terrorism partnerships and economic competition with China over the harder work of supporting institutional development that might enable genuine stability.
Conclusion
Ahmed al-Sharaa's unprecedented White House visit represents the crystallization of a new U.S. approach to Middle East engagement: pragmatic acceptance of imperfect partners in service of narrow counter-terrorism and great power competition objectives, coupled with rhetorical support for governance reforms unlikely to be implemented. This model offers potential short-term gains—degrading ISIS capabilities, expanding American economic presence, countering Chinese influence—while accepting considerable long-term risks.
The structural challenges remain profound: Kurdish integration that satisfies neither Kurdish aspirations for autonomy nor Turkish demands for centralized control; reconstruction that proceeds along sectarian and geographic lines reinforcing fragmentation; counter-terrorism cooperation that legitimizes monopolization of force without accountability; and regional relationships that require Syria to balance contradictory external pressures from Washington, Beijing, Ankara, and Tehran.
Whether this visit initiates a genuine transformation of U.S.-Syria relations or represents a tactical pause before renewed instability depends less on the diplomatic pageantry than on how these underlying structural contradictions are managed. The evidence suggests Washington is betting that al-Sharaa can navigate these contradictions while maintaining sufficient stability to serve American interests. History advises skepticism about such bets in Syria's complex sectarian landscape, but the immediate alternatives—continued isolation or allowing competitors free rein—appear even less appealing to policymakers prioritizing short-term strategic positioning over long-term regional stability.
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