The recapture of Kyaukme marks a turning point in Myanmar's conflict, but territorial gains mask deeper challenges for both sides as China's influence reshapes the battlefield
In early October 2025, Myanmar's military junta achieved what many observers had deemed unlikely just months earlier: the recapture of Kyaukme, a strategic town in Shan State that had fallen to ethnic armed groups more than a year prior. After a brutal 21-day offensive against the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), which had seized the town in August 2024, regime forces retook control on October 2, securing a vital trade route to China and delivering a significant psychological blow to opposition forces that had been steadily gaining ground since late 2023.
Yet this tactical victory tells only part of Myanmar's increasingly complex story. As the military intensifies its counteroffensives using drone warfare and aerial bombardment—launching coordinated attacks to retake Momauk town in Kachin State and escalating clashes near Nawnghkio Township to secure the Mandalay-Muse highway—the human cost continues to mount. The junta's "scorched earth" tactics, including lethal airstrikes on civilian gatherings, displaced persons camps, schools, and hospitals, have killed dozens in September alone across Bago, Chin, Magwe, Kachin, and Mandalay states. Meanwhile, the regime's political strategy of planning highly contested elections for late 2025, accompanied by death penalties for election disruptions and martial law in over 60 resistance-held townships, raises a fundamental question: Can Myanmar's military consolidate its recent gains into lasting control, or do these victories merely postpone an inevitable reckoning in a civil war that has already displaced 3.5 million people and left 21.9 million in need of humanitarian assistance?
Kyaukme's location makes it far more than just another contested town in Myanmar's sprawling civil war. Situated approximately 115 kilometers northeast of Mandalay, the country's second-largest city, the town sits at a critical junction on National Highway 3, which connects central Myanmar to China's Yunnan province. Control of this artery means control over trade flows, military reinforcements, and the economic lifeline that keeps either side's war effort viable.
The town's recapture represents the culmination of a broader military strategy that has been unfolding since mid-2024. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, "In recent months, Myanmar's military junta has regained ground lost to organized resistance groups" after suffering consistent territorial losses since the February 2021 coup. The offensive to retake Kyaukme, launched on August 19, 2025, was part of a systematic effort to secure National Highway 3 and re-establish regime control over key trade infrastructure ahead of planned December elections.
When Associated Press journalists were granted rare access to Kyaukme in mid-October—the only foreign media permitted to visit under military supervision—they found a town in shambles. The once-thriving community of 46,000 had been largely abandoned, with charred wreckage of official buildings including the courthouse, police station, and government housing scattered throughout. While civilian houses appeared mostly unscathed except those near damaged official buildings, the population had fled, leaving streets virtually deserted.
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The expanding role of drone warfare
The conflict in Myanmar has increasingly become a testing ground for low-cost aerial warfare technologies that are reshaping modern insurgencies worldwide. Both the military junta and resistance forces have rapidly adopted and adapted drone capabilities, creating an arms race that has fundamentally altered battlefield dynamics.
For resistance groups, drones have provided an asymmetric advantage against the better-equipped military. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), resistance groups have conducted over 2,100 drone strike events across more than 600 distinct locations in Myanmar since December 2021, when the first use of drones by resistance groups was reported in Pale township of the Sagaing region. Specialized units like Federal Wings and Cloud Wings, associated with the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army, have modified commercial drones—such as those used for aerial photography and agriculture—into attack platforms equipped with small explosive devices.
The resistance's most dramatic drone operations have targeted high-value military assets and leadership. On April 4, 2024, resistance groups simultaneously attacked the Aye Lar military airbase and the military headquarters in Nay Pyi Taw with kamikaze drones. The groups claimed successful strikes, reporting that a fire broke out at the Aye Law airbase, where two military soldiers were killed and four others were injured. In another high-profile attack on April 8, 2024, resistance groups launched five kamikaze drones during a visit by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the military, Soe Win, to the Southeastern Military Regional Command in Mawlamyine. A follow-up strike on April 9 claimed to have hit a stadium and helicopter unit, destroying two military helicopters.
However, the military has been rapidly closing the technology gap. Since late 2024, the junta has deployed advanced drones acquired from China, Russia, and Belarus, equipped with thermal imaging, forward-looking infrared technology, and night vision cameras. These capabilities have proven particularly devastating in recent operations. In Bhamo, Kachin state, the military's use of drones with thermal imaging has "dramatically slowed resistance advances," according to analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Kachin Independence Army and its allies launched an attack on December 4, 2024, initially taking several key sites including the airport, but they are now struggling to defeat the military in multiple locations due to the sophisticated drone surveillance that makes advancing extremely difficult.
The military has also introduced paramotors—motorized paragliders that can seat up to three soldiers to drop bombs or fire at targets—as a lethal new weapon in its aerial arsenal. The junta's first recorded use of paramotors was in December 2024, and they have since been deployed more widely, according to ACLED. These low-tech but deadly platforms "bridge the gap between drones and aircraft, offering longer range and greater payload capacity than drones at a fraction of the cost of helicopters," explained Min Zaw Oo from the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security.
The human cost of this aerial warfare has been staggering. On October 7, 2025, a paramotor attack on a Buddhist festival in Chaung U township in Sagaing region killed at least 20 people, according to eyewitnesses, Amnesty International, the shadow National Unity Government, and local armed resistance groups. The military confirmed the attack but claimed it was targeting resistance forces using civilians as "human shields"—an accusation that local residents and resistance fighters vehemently denied, stating that people joined the ceremony of their own free will.
China's decisive intervention reshapes the conflict
No external actor has influenced Myanmar's civil war trajectory more dramatically than China. Beijing's intervention in 2024 and 2025 has proven decisive in preventing regime collapse and imposing a new strategic reality on the conflict—one that favors stability and Chinese economic interests over any particular political outcome.
China's motivations are straightforward and primarily economic. Myanmar provides critical access to the Indian Ocean through the deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State, the starting point of 973-kilometer overland pipelines supplying gas and crude oil to China's Yunnan province. The country also hosts numerous Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects and possesses extensive deposits of rare earth minerals—resources that have reportedly attracted interest from the Trump administration, which is "weighing whether to engage with the junta, in part because Myanmar possesses extensive deposits of rare earth minerals," according to the Council on Foreign Relations.
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The humanitarian catastrophe deepens
Myanmar's civil war has generated one of the world's most severe humanitarian crises, with conditions deteriorating sharply throughout 2025. The March 28 earthquake—measuring 7.7 magnitude and the most powerful to hit Myanmar in decades—compounded an already desperate situation, killing more than 3,800 people and injuring over 5,000 according to UN estimates as of early April.
The earthquake struck densely populated areas in Mandalay, Sagaing, and Nay Pyi Taw regions—areas already affected by conflict where nearly half of the country's 3.5 million internally displaced people live. The disaster damaged roads and communication networks, overwhelmed health facilities, and disrupted water and sanitation infrastructure, increasing the risk of disease outbreaks including cholera, typhoid, and respiratory infections.
Yet the natural disaster represents only one dimension of Myanmar's humanitarian emergency. According to the UN, 21.9 million people—over a third of the population—now require humanitarian assistance, up from just 1 million before the military takeover in 2021. This includes over 6 million children who have limited or no access to healthcare and education, suffer from food insecurity and malnutrition, and face protection risks including forced recruitment, landmines, and mental distress.
The junta has systematically obstructed humanitarian aid delivery as a method of collective punishment against civilian populations. From January to June 2024, humanitarian organizations reported 682 incidents impeding the delivery of aid. The military has blocked earthquake aid deliveries to resistance-controlled territories, established roadblocks, suspended telecommunications, denied travel authorizations, blocked mobile payments, and increased scrutiny at checkpoints—particularly in resistance strongholds. Junta officials reportedly blocked the transport of food and other aid materials in Bago Region and Karenni and Shan States.
In Rakhine State, where fighting between the military and Arakan Army has intensified since November 2023, the humanitarian situation has become particularly acute. Phone and internet connections have been shut down since January, completely or partially in many locations, with the exception of Ann, Gwa, Munaung, and Thandwe townships. This communication blackout severely limits people's ability to access and share information about their safety and assistance while hampering humanitarian organizations' capacity to coordinate with teams on the ground.
The conflict has internally displaced more than 380,000 people in Rakhine State and southern Chin State since November 2023. Many vulnerable displaced people face water scarcity, with closure of roads and waterways and local movement restrictions further restricting access to markets where these are operating. Since the resumption of conflict, people in Rakhine have grappled with soaring prices and unavailability of food and other essential supplies, with cash in short supply due to banking disruptions.
The situation for the Rohingya minority has become particularly dire. About 630,000 Rohingya remain in Rakhine State, subject to systematic abuses that amount to crimes against humanity including apartheid, persecution, and deprivation of liberty, with approximately 150,000 held in open-air detention camps. Caught between junta forces and the Arakan Army, Rohingya civilians have been subjected to forced recruitment, with the junta recruiting thousands of Rohingya men and boys from Rakhine State and refugee camps in Bangladesh in violation of domestic law. On August 5, 2025, approximately 180 people were reportedly killed following drone strikes and shelling on civilians fleeing fighting in Maungdaw town.
The 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, which appealed for $994 million, was only 4 percent funded a quarter of the way into the year. The 2025 appeal seeking $1.1 billion to support 5.5 million people faces even more severe funding shortages, with only 12 percent of required funds disbursed. The situation has been further complicated by the Trump administration's decision to abolish USAID, eliminating what had been the world's largest source of humanitarian funding and forcing reductions across all sectors of humanitarian response.
Elections and the illusion of legitimacy
The military junta's plan to hold elections in late 2025 represents an attempt to manufacture legitimacy for continued military rule rather than a genuine opening toward democratic governance. On October 15, 2025, junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing acknowledged that the military-backed administration would be unable to conduct the election across the entire country as the civil war continues to rage. The junta was able to conduct a full, on-ground census to generate voter lists in only 145 of the country's 330 townships, according to a December census report that put Myanmar's total population at 51.3 million.
The elections are widely viewed by critics and Western nations as "a sham exercise to legitimise the military's rule via proxy political parties," according to Reuters. Dozens of anti-junta parties are either banned or refusing to take part. The military-led government has said that polls would be held in phases, starting on December 28, with a result date expected at the end of January. State media reported that 57 political parties "that comply with legal requirements" and over 5,000 candidates would run in the national election.
To suppress opposition to the elections, the junta has enacted harsh legal measures. In July 2025, the regime extended its "state of emergency" for an additional six months to prepare for the polls. The junta launched a new Election Protection Law that punishes opposing the planned elections with sentences ranging from three to ten years imprisonment and fines, with those whose disruptions result in someone's death facing the death penalty. The Irrawaddy reported that the junta has prosecuted 64 people since July under this law, with rights groups saying the crackdown aims to quash dissent.
The regime has also deployed extensive surveillance measures. In October, the junta launched a nationwide census with an extensive list of 68 questions that appear designed to root out opposition activists and eligible military recruits. In May, the junta began requiring all individuals to obtain biometric e-IDs in order to leave the country. The military severely restricts internet and phone services, with rolling shutdowns around the country—particularly in conflict areas—that gravely impact access to information, humanitarian efforts, and community protection.
Under Myanmar's constitution, the state of emergency must first be lifted for elections to take place, at which point the National Defence and Security Council needs to appoint an interim government, with elections to be held within six months. An interim government will most likely be named at the next scheduled meeting of the council on July 31, 2025. Since the body is dominated by Min Aung Hlaing and his allies, the interim government is likely to be a rebranded version of the current regime administration, still headed by Min Aung Hlaing.
Malaysia announced it would send observation teams to the election, following talks between Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan and junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. However, this decision has been criticized by human rights organizations and opposition groups who argue that international observation lends unwarranted credibility to an illegitimate process.
The military's persistent weaknesses
Despite recent tactical gains, Myanmar's military faces fundamental structural problems that limit its ability to consolidate control or achieve decisive victory. The regime's manpower crisis remains acute, with the military struggling to maintain sufficient forces across the multiple fronts where it is engaged.
In February 2024, facing depleted ranks, the junta activated the 2010 People's Military Service Law, enabling the conscription of men ages 18 to 35 and women ages 18 to 27 for up to five years. Myanmar's military has a long history of employing abusive recruitment tactics, and rates of arrests and people fleeing the country both increased in response to the conscription law. Since implementation, the military has conscripted approximately 30,000 people, prompting an exodus of young people fleeing Myanmar's cities.
Military authorities have used abductions and detention of family members to carry out conscription, including of children. Conscripts have been used as human shields and porters on the front lines. In August 2025, the junta announced it would recruit men ages 35 to 65 to join newly developed "people's security and counterterrorism teams." According to The Irrawaddy, "More than 2,000 junta soldiers, police and conscripts defected, surrendered, or were captured from January to September [of 2025], according to People's Goal, a group formed by defecting soldiers. Many defections were linked to the junta's Conscription Law, which has driven growing numbers of young men to flee military service and seek protection with resistance forces."
The manpower shortage has direct battlefield consequences. Morgan Michaels of the UK's International Institute for Strategic Studies noted that the military "could muster few reinforcements late last year as the AA bore down on its regional command base for western Myanmar, which it took, dealing the junta another heavy blow." He explained: "Basically, the military cannot respond to protect or wage counter attacks at these very sensitive and important strategic areas because of the manpower issue. Opposition forces have their own limitations. But if the military can't respond, then it's going to bit by bit lose these areas."
The military also faces severe economic constraints. The country is experiencing significant economic pressures and high rates of food insecurity, with poverty rates soaring and the kyat depreciating sharply. These economic problems limit the regime's ability to sustain military operations, purchase equipment, and offer material incentives that previous military administrations used to secure ceasefires with ethnic armed groups.
According to a BBC World Service study, the junta maintained full control of only 21 percent of Myanmar as of mid-November 2024, with rebel groups holding 42 percent and both sides contesting the rest. While the military retains control over most urban areas including the largest cities where most of the population lives, it has lost significant territory in border regions. Conflict data analyzed by the International Institute for Strategic Studies shows no letup in the overall level of violence, with estimates of civilians and soldiers killed in the fighting stretching into the tens of thousands.
A quagmire with no end in sight
Myanmar's civil war has evolved into what the Council on Foreign Relations characterizes as "a quagmire in which neither side now seems capable of making further substantial gains, though they both can kill more people. The regime does so in a particularly brutal manner, regularly bombing civilians in towns, festivals, and other places."
The military's recent tactical victories, including the recapture of Kyaukme, have not fundamentally altered this strategic stalemate. While China's intervention has prevented regime collapse and imposed ceasefires with some armed groups, it remains unclear whether Beijing has the ability—or the will—to impose similar deals on groups in other parts of the country. The Arakan Army continues its advance in Rakhine State despite Chinese economic interests there, and the Kachin Independence Army presses toward Bhamo in the north.
For the opposition forces, challenges include an ever-short supply of ammunition and limited strategic coordination between groups—many fighting for territory for any one of the country's myriad ethnic minorities—across the whole country. China's pressure on the United Wa State Army to cut back on weapons sales to other groups has forced some resistance forces to scale back offensives. The MNDAA's decision to halt its push toward Mandalay has relieved pressure on the regime in central Myanmar.
Yet most analysts expect resistance groups to continue advancing despite these constraints. "The military has lost significant control, and in 2025, based on that trajectory over late 2023 and 2024, it will still continue to lose control," said Matthew Arnold. The rebels' gains over the past year have transformed the war by linking up what were mostly pockets of armed resistance into long stretches across the country which the military can no longer penetrate overland.
The humanitarian toll continues to mount. More than 3.2 million people have been internally displaced since the coup, including over 1.8 million since the escalation of fighting in October 2023. The majority live in makeshift shelters and open fields with limited access to food, healthcare, and water. Myanmar topped the global list of landmine casualties for the first time in 2023, with 889 civilian casualties from landmines and explosive remnants of war documented in the first nine months of 2024, including 245 children.
International accountability efforts have advanced, with the International Criminal Court prosecutor requesting an arrest warrant for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in November 2024 for alleged crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution of the Rohingya. However, the court's investigation is limited to crimes committed at least in part in Bangladesh, an ICC member country. The International Court of Justice has accepted interventions by seven governments in Gambia's case against Myanmar under the Genocide Convention, though the military's escalating abuses underscore its blatant disregard for the binding provisional measures ordered by the court.
The erosion of U.S. leadership on democracy and human rights under the Trump administration has reduced the political cost for regional powers seeking to normalize ties with the junta. Many neighboring states now see little to gain from prolonged diplomatic isolation of the regime and are likely to re-establish normal relations with whatever administration emerges from the year-end elections. UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar criticized recent U.S. decisions to rollback sanctions on Myanmar military suppliers despite evidence of their involvement in war crimes.
As Myanmar's civil war enters its fifth year, the country faces a choice between continued descent into violence and fragmentation or a negotiated settlement that addresses the root causes of conflict. The military's planned elections offer no path toward the latter. Without genuine political dialogue, an end to atrocities against civilians, and meaningful international pressure on all parties to seek compromise, Myanmar appears destined to remain trapped in a cycle of violence that serves no one's interests—except perhaps those who profit from chaos and suffering. The question is not whether Myanmar can afford this trajectory, but how much more destruction the country and its people can endure before the foundations of the state itself collapse beyond repair.
