Between April and November 2025, more than 105 cargo aircraft landed at a small airstrip in southeastern Libya that, until recently, had been largely dormant. Kufrah airport, controlled by forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Haftar and overseen locally by Mohamed Mezewghi—a figure with close ties to the United Arab Emirates—has become what experts and officials now describe as a critical logistics node for Sudan's Rapid Support Forces. Satellite imagery, flight-tracking data, and multiple independent investigations point to a sustained pattern of weapons, fuel, and personnel movements through Haftar-held territory into the conflict zone next door.
This airbridge matters because it has extended the RSF's operational reach at a time when other supply routes face increased scrutiny. While both the UAE and the RSF deny any military relationship, the documented surge in cargo activity at Kufrah, combined with parallel flows through Chad and Somalia, reveals a regionalized logistics architecture that has fundamentally altered the balance of Sudan's war. The evidence sits uncomfortably alongside the denials: flight logs, fuel ledgers, and systematic patterns of external support that enable RSF offensives far from any natural supply base.
The logistics picture
Flight-tracking analysis and satellite imagery reviewed by Reuters and other outlets show dozens of heavy-lift cargo planes—primarily Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft—operating through Kufrah since spring 2025. Two specific tail numbers, EX-76017 and EX-76022, both linked to Kyrgyz operators previously named in UN expert panel reports on weapons trafficking to Haftar, have made repeated runs between UAE airports, Chad's Amdjarass airstrip, and Kufrah.
Mohamed Mezewghi, formerly of the LNA's 128th Brigade and now heading consolidated southern forces, has overseen a restructuring that brings UAE-aligned command to the border region. Concurrently, Al-Khadim Airbase near Benghazi—widely understood to host UAE military operations in Libya—remains an active hub for similar aircraft. Sudan's army has repeatedly accused the RSF of receiving military cargo via Libya, and in September, a formal complaint to the UN alleged that Colombian mercenaries transited Kufrah en route to RSF lines.
The Sentry, a conflict-finance watchdog, has documented Haftar's networks as "key fuel suppliers" to the RSF on behalf of Emirati interests. Libya's illicit fuel economy—estimated to cost the state billions annually—provides both the commodity and the financial opacity that make such transfers feasible. Haftar's son and LNA chief of staff, Saddam Haftar, toured Kufrah to inspect southern operations and has since advanced diplomatic engagement with Washington, even as his forces increased personnel and equipment deployments to secure cross-border logistics.
Members are reading: How Libya's fuel economy and Haftar's strategic calculus turned a desert runway into a regional proxy-war hub.
Escalation and airspace risks
The convergence of military and civilian aviation infrastructure raises immediate risks. Libya's Government of National Unity, based in Tripoli, announced direct air route talks with Dubai in September 2025, even as cargo operations through LNA-held airports continued. The blurring of civilian and military airspace creates deconfliction hazards and complicates international monitoring.
Sudan's threats to strike Chadian airports signal a dangerous escalation dynamic. If Khartoum perceives Kufrah as a similarly viable target, the conflict could spill directly into Libyan territory, drawing Haftar and potentially his backers into a broader confrontation. The same opacity that provides deniability to external actors—unlabeled cargo, shell-company operators, fuel laundering—also erodes the distinction between combatant and civilian infrastructure, increasing the likelihood of miscalculation.
Accountability and endurance
The Kufrah airbridge matters because it sustains RSF operational endurance at a time when the humanitarian toll in Sudan has reached catastrophic levels. Fuel, ammunition, and foreign fighters extend the paramilitary's capacity to besiege cities, displace populations, and resist negotiated settlements. The supply architecture documented through Kufrah, Chad, and Somalia is not ancillary to the war; it is enabling infrastructure.
Yet accountability remains elusive. UN arms embargoes on Libya prove ineffective; UAE denials face minimal diplomatic cost; Haftar's economic networks operate with near-impunity. The gap between documentation and enforcement allows a remote desert runway to reshape the strategic balance of a war that has already displaced millions and killed tens of thousands. Until that gap closes, the cargo flights will continue, and so will the killing.
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