Eritrea's Hidden Role in Sudan's War Reshapes Regional Power

• Eritrea has established three training facilities and aircraft hosting infrastructure for Sudan's SAF, fundamentally altering regional conflict dynamics
• External military support from Eritrea, UAE, and Egypt enables indefinite stalemate, blocking peace negotiations for 30 million people in crisis
• Sudan's humanitarian catastrophe—world's worst—worsens as international funding falls to 14% while regional proxy competition intensifies

As Khartoum and Port Sudan compete for legitimacy, a third player emerges from the shadows with military bases, training camps, and strategic ambitions that could reshape the Horn of Africa's balance of power

The war in Sudan has entered a dangerous new phase—not because of battlefield gains by either the Sudanese Armed Forces or the Rapid Support Forces, but because of what is happening across the border in Eritrea. As of October 2025, Eritrea has significantly deepened its involvement in Sudan's civil war by providing training grounds, logistical support, and hosting facilities for Sudanese military aircraft and fighters loyal to General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. This escalation represents far more than simple military cooperation between neighbors; it signals the emergence of Eritrea as a pivotal external actor whose involvement fundamentally complicates prospects for peace in a conflict that has already displaced over 12 million people and created the world's largest humanitarian crisis.

The timing of Eritrea's expanded role is particularly significant. Relations between the SAF leadership and Ethiopia have deteriorated sharply, with Ethiopia widely perceived as favoring the RSF due to its ties with the United Arab Emirates, a key RSF backer. This regional realignment has created a vacuum that Eritrea has eagerly filled, positioning itself as an indispensable ally to Sudan's military government at precisely the moment when international peace efforts—including those by the Quad mechanism involving the United States and regional states—have stalled completely.

The question facing diplomats, humanitarian workers, and millions of Sudanese civilians is stark: Can peace be achieved in Sudan when external powers are not only fueling the conflict but actively establishing military infrastructure to sustain it?

Eritrea's decision to deepen its involvement in Sudan's conflict reflects a calculated strategic repositioning in the Horn of Africa. By hosting Sudanese military forces and aircraft, Eritrea is not merely offering tactical support—it is embedding itself into Sudan's military infrastructure in ways that create long-term dependencies and strategic leverage.

The relationship builds on historical precedent. During Ethiopia's Tigray conflict, Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces, demonstrating its willingness to intervene militarily in regional disputes. Now, with Ethiopia accused of maintaining a complex stance that many perceive as favoring the RSF, Eritrea has positioned itself as the SAF's most reliable regional partner.

This alignment serves multiple Eritrean interests. First, it provides Eritrea with strategic depth and potential access to Sudan's Red Sea coast, a long-standing geopolitical objective. Second, it positions Eritrea as a counterweight to Ethiopian influence in the region, continuing a pattern of rivalry that has defined Horn of Africa politics for decades. Third, it offers Eritrea an opportunity to break out of its international isolation by becoming indispensable to a government that, despite the ongoing conflict, still controls Sudan's seat at international organizations.

According to reports documented by regional observers, Eritrea has established training camps for fighters loyal to General al-Burhan and is hosting Sudanese military aircraft—capabilities that extend the SAF's operational reach and provide crucial rear-area support that would otherwise be unavailable given the RSF's control of large swaths of Sudanese territory.

The Ethiopia factor and shifting regional alignments

The deterioration of relations between Sudan's SAF leadership and Ethiopia represents one of the most significant regional realignments in the Horn of Africa in recent years. Ethiopia's perceived tilt toward the RSF—driven largely by its close relationship with the United Arab Emirates—has fundamentally altered the strategic landscape and created the opening for Eritrea's expanded role.

This shift is particularly striking given Ethiopia's historical position as a regional diplomatic heavyweight. Ethiopia hosts the African Union headquarters and has traditionally played a mediating role in regional conflicts. However, its complex internal dynamics, including the aftermath of the Tigray conflict and ongoing tensions with Eritrea, have constrained its ability to act as an honest broker in Sudan.

The UAE connection is crucial to understanding this dynamic. The United Arab Emirates has been widely accused of providing substantial financial and military support to the RSF, though Abu Dhabi denies these allegations. Ethiopia's economic and diplomatic ties to the UAE—including significant UAE investment in Ethiopian infrastructure and development projects—create a structural alignment that, regardless of official policy, influences perceptions of where Ethiopian sympathies lie.

For Eritrea, Ethiopia's perceived pro-RSF stance represents both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge lies in the potential for Ethiopia to use its relationship with the RSF to encircle Eritrea strategically. The opportunity lies in positioning itself as the anti-Ethiopia power in the region, offering the SAF an alternative to Ethiopian influence.

This dynamic has historical echoes. Eritrea and Ethiopia fought a devastating border war from 1998 to 2000, and despite a 2018 peace agreement, mutual suspicions remain deep. In October 2025, Ethiopia accused Eritrea of preparing for war, citing Eritrean support for armed groups on Ethiopian soil, including collusion with factions of the Tigray People's Liberation Front. Ethiopia's foreign minister claimed in a letter to the UN Secretary-General that Eritrea was "funding, mobilizing and directing armed groups" within Ethiopian territory.

These accusations, whether fully accurate or not, illustrate the depth of mistrust and the ease with which the Sudan conflict could metastasize into a broader regional confrontation. If Ethiopia perceives Eritrea's support for the SAF as a direct threat to Ethiopian interests, it may respond by deepening support for the RSF, creating a classic proxy conflict dynamic that could persist for years.

Humanitarian consequences of external intervention

The humanitarian implications of Eritrea's deepening involvement extend far beyond military strategy. Sudan is experiencing what the United Nations has described as the world's worst humanitarian crisis, with over 30 million people—more than half of Sudan's population—in need of humanitarian assistance. The conflict has displaced more than 12 million people, including over 8.6 million internally and nearly 4 million who have fled to neighboring countries.

Famine has been officially declared in multiple areas, including the Zamzam camp in Darfur, and is spreading to at least 10 additional locations. More than 24 million people face acute food insecurity, with over 635,000 experiencing famine conditions and heightened risk of death. Sudan now has more people living in famine conditions than the rest of the world combined.

External military support that prolongs the conflict directly exacerbates this humanitarian catastrophe. Every week that fighting continues is another week that humanitarian corridors remain closed, that hospitals remain non-functional, and that displaced populations cannot return home. More than 80% of hospitals in conflict zones are non-operational, and the World Health Organization has verified at least 119 attacks on healthcare facilities between April 2023 and October 2024, though the true figure is likely much higher.

The cholera outbreak that has killed more than 1,600 people and infected over 60,000 between August 2024 and May 2025 is a direct consequence of the conflict's destruction of water and sanitation infrastructure. The combination of conflict, displacement, destroyed infrastructure, and limited access to clean water creates ideal conditions for disease transmission.

Women and children bear a disproportionate burden. Gender-based violence is escalating, with widespread reports of intimate partner violence, sexual exploitation, abuse, and trafficking. In Darfur, alarming reports of sexual violence underscore the immense suffering endured by those in dire conditions. The collapse of critical healthcare services has made it nearly impossible for pregnant women to access essential reproductive care, putting mothers and newborns at extreme risk.

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The stalled peace process and international response

International efforts to broker peace in Sudan have made virtually no progress despite numerous initiatives. The Quad mechanism—involving the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—represents one of the most prominent international efforts, but has failed to produce meaningful results as both the SAF and RSF remain committed to military solutions.

On September 12, 2025, the Quad foreign ministers issued a joint statement calling for an initial three-month humanitarian truce to allow rapid delivery of assistance across Sudan, with the aim of paving the way for a permanent ceasefire. The statement proposed that an inclusive and transparent transition process be launched and concluded within nine months, leading to the establishment of an independent, civilian-led government. However, this initiative, like previous efforts, has not translated into action on the ground.

The United Nations and African Union have been urged by regional and international actors to take decisive and coordinated action, but both organizations have struggled to exert meaningful influence. UN Personal Envoy for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra has undertaken regional tours aimed at advancing peace efforts, meeting with various stakeholders including independent civilian representatives and delegations from different political alliances. However, these consultations have not yet produced a breakthrough.

The fundamental problem is that neither warring party sees negotiation as preferable to continued fighting. The SAF, bolstered by external support from Eritrea and Egypt, believes it can achieve military victory. The RSF, backed by the UAE and controlling significant territory including most of Darfur, similarly calculates that time is on its side. In April 2025, the RSF announced the formation of a parallel "Government of Peace and Unity" to administer areas under its control, signaling its intent to establish de facto statehood rather than negotiate reintegration.

This mutual commitment to military solutions is reinforced by external actors whose support makes protracted conflict sustainable. As long as the SAF can rely on Eritrean training facilities and logistical support, and the RSF can count on UAE weapons and financial backing, both sides can continue fighting indefinitely, regardless of the humanitarian cost.

The international community's response has been characterized by what regional analysts describe as strategic incoherence. Western powers condemn the humanitarian catastrophe but take no meaningful action to constrain their regional allies who are fueling the conflict. The United States sanctioned RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo in January 2025 after determining that the RSF had committed genocide in Darfur, but has been reluctant to pressure the UAE, a key strategic partner, to cease its support for the RSF.

Similarly, while international organizations call for arms embargoes and accountability, the UN Security Council remains deadlocked. On October 1, 2025, Security Council members convened for closed consultations on Sudan, receiving updates on the humanitarian and political situations. However, divergent interests among Security Council members—particularly between Western powers and Russia and China—prevent unified action.

The regional spillover and refugee crisis

The Sudan conflict is not contained within Sudan's borders. Nearly 4 million people have fled to neighboring countries, creating immense strain on nations that are themselves struggling with poverty, conflict, and limited resources. Chad hosts over 773,000 Sudanese refugees, South Sudan has received 349,935, Ethiopia 43,159, and Uganda 72,125. Egypt hosts the largest number at approximately 1.5 million.

These refugee flows are destabilizing neighboring countries and creating conditions for broader regional conflict. Chad, which shares a long border with Sudan's Darfur region, has seen more than 68,000 arrivals in a single month as of April 2025, pushing the country's humanitarian response to a breaking point. Chad now hosts over a million refugees, including over 800,000 from Sudan since the conflict began.

Health centers near the Sudan border in Chad's Wadi-Fira province are struggling to keep up, running low on essential medicines and lacking specialized care for mental health and reproductive health needs. Meanwhile, over 100,000 children in Eastern Chad are facing severe acute malnutrition as of April 2025.

South Sudan, which gained independence from Sudan in 2011 after decades of civil war, faces particular challenges. Most of those arriving are South Sudanese returnees who had been living in Sudan as refugees and are now returning to a country that lacks the infrastructure and resources to accommodate them. South Sudan itself faces political instability and ethnic violence, with approximately 300,000 people fleeing the country in 2025 alone due to escalating internal conflict.

The regional dimensions of the crisis extend beyond refugee flows. Sudan's conflicts have historically involved cross-border dynamics, with various actors supporting insurgent groups in neighboring countries. Sudan's government has supported the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, while Uganda has backed Sudanese rebel groups. Ethiopia and Eritrea have long used Sudanese territory as a battleground for their own rivalry.

Eritrea's deepening involvement in Sudan threatens to activate these historical patterns of cross-border conflict. If Ethiopia perceives Eritrea's support for the SAF as a strategic threat, it may respond by deepening support for the RSF or for other armed groups that can pressure Eritrea. This could create a regional proxy conflict that draws in multiple countries and makes peace even more elusive.

The African Union and IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) have called for coordinated regional responses, but these organizations face their own internal divisions and limited capacity to enforce decisions. The AU Peace and Security Council has urged decisive action, but lacks the mechanisms to compel member states to cease supporting warring parties.

What comes next for Sudan and the region

The trajectory of Sudan's conflict in late 2025 suggests several possible scenarios, none of them encouraging. The most likely outcome is continued stalemate, with neither side able to achieve decisive military victory but both unwilling to negotiate seriously. This scenario condemns Sudan to years of protracted conflict, deepening humanitarian catastrophe, and potential state collapse.

Eritrea's expanded role makes this stalemate more likely by providing the SAF with capabilities that prevent military defeat while not being sufficient to achieve victory. The result is a conflict that can continue indefinitely, sustained by external support on both sides.

A second possibility is territorial partition, either de facto or de jure. The RSF's April 2025 announcement of a parallel government suggests it is preparing for long-term control of western Sudan, particularly Darfur. If this consolidation continues, Sudan could fracture into separate entities, similar to Libya's division between rival governments. Such an outcome would have profound implications for regional stability, potentially creating ungoverned spaces that could harbor terrorist groups or become bases for regional destabilization.

A third scenario involves escalation to broader regional conflict. If Ethiopia and Eritrea's proxy competition in Sudan intensifies, it could reignite direct conflict between those two countries, potentially drawing in other regional actors. The Horn of Africa has multiple overlapping conflicts and rivalries that could be activated by Sudan's war.

The international community faces a choice. It can continue its current approach of humanitarian assistance without meaningful diplomatic engagement, accepting protracted conflict as inevitable. Or it can mount a serious, coordinated effort to address the root causes of the conflict, including by pressuring external actors to cease military support for the warring parties.

Such an effort would require Western powers to leverage their relationships with Gulf states, particularly the UAE, to cut off support for the RSF. It would require engaging with Eritrea and Egypt to reduce support for the SAF. And it would require a credible political process that offers both warring parties a path to power-sharing and accountability that is preferable to continued fighting.

The obstacles to such an approach are formidable. The Trump administration has given limited indication of its Sudan policy, beyond rejecting the RSF's parallel government and suggesting a harder line on UAE support for the RSF. Whether this translates into sustained diplomatic engagement remains unclear. European powers, preoccupied with Ukraine and domestic political challenges, have shown limited appetite for deep engagement in Sudan.

Meanwhile, the humanitarian catastrophe deepens. Every day of continued conflict means more deaths from violence, starvation, and disease. More children miss education, more women face sexual violence, more families are displaced from their homes. The scale of suffering is almost incomprehensible—30 million people in need of assistance, 12 million displaced, famine spreading across multiple regions.

Eritrea's deepening involvement is not the cause of Sudan's crisis, but it is a critical factor in its perpetuation. By providing the SAF with secure rear areas, training facilities, and logistical support, Eritrea is enabling the conflict to continue when it might otherwise have reached a point where military solutions became untenable. This makes Eritrea's role a legitimate target for international diplomatic pressure and a necessary component of any serious peace effort.

The question is whether the international community has the will to act before Sudan's collapse becomes irreversible, and before the conflict spreads to engulf the entire Horn of Africa region in a conflagration that could take decades to resolve.