On December 4, 2025, officials in Washington signed the DRC-Rwanda accords designed to end three years of escalating violence in eastern Congo. Six days later, M23 fighters and aligned forces seized Uvira, a strategic South Kivu hub, triggering UN Security Council condemnation and warnings of "regional flare-up with incalculable consequences." The juxtaposition was not coincidental; it exposed the structural flaw at the heart of the agreement: a state-to-state framework that left the principal armed actor on the ground—M23—outside the room.
The Washington Accords built on a preliminary June 27 deal and established a roadmap for Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) withdrawal, DRC action against the FDLR militia, joint oversight mechanisms, and a Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) centered on critical minerals trade and investment. Yet by excluding M23, the accords created a dual-track system—Washington for Kinshasa and Kigali, Doha for DRC and the insurgents—that M23 exploited as diplomatic cover for territorial consolidation. What followed was not peace implementation but tactical deception: partial withdrawals announced under the Doha framework while frontlines shifted and civilian populations remained besieged.
Dual diplomacy, military advantage
The Washington track and the Doha insurgent process were never synchronized. The Doha Declaration of Principles (July 19) and framework agreement (November 15) promised ceasefire verification and implementation involving M23 directly. Yet fighting persisted throughout. M23's December offensive into South Kivu—culminating in the Uvira seizure—proceeded even as both accords technically remained in force. On December 15, M23 announced a unilateral withdrawal from Uvira, but local authorities and reporting indicated elements remained, some "disguised as civilians," with rebel policing units visible in town and active frontlines persisting around Makobola, Kasekesi, and Munene.
This pattern—public withdrawal rhetoric paired with tactical repositioning—allowed M23 to shape perception while retaining leverage. Forum-shopping between Washington's state commitments and Doha's insurgent verification turned "implementation" into a moving target, enabling the movement to control territory, restrict MONUSCO access, and impose constraints on fuel, water, electricity, and humanitarian movement around Goma and elsewhere. The result was not a ceasefire but a managed ambiguity that prolonged military advantage.
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Humanitarian collapse and MONUSCO's constrained mandate
The diplomatic misalignment had immediate human costs. UN Security Council Resolution 2808, adopted in late 2025, renewed MONUSCO's mandate to December 20, 2026, maintaining troop ceilings of 11,500 military personnel, 600 observers and staff officers, 443 police, and 1,270 formed police unit personnel. The Force Intervention Brigade was renewed on an "exceptional basis," with core operations in North Kivu and Ituri. Any South Kivu ceasefire monitoring deployment required Council notification—a procedural hurdle that delayed response as M23 moved south.
MONUSCO currently provides direct physical protection to around 100,000 displaced civilians sheltering near its bases. Health systems are collapsing: Médecins Sans Frontières reported nearly 28,000 survivors of sexual violence sought care in the first six months of the year; cholera cases surpassed 38,000, with deaths more than doubling year-on-year. Goma airport closure and M23-imposed restrictions on movement, fuel, water, and electricity compounded the crisis, limiting both humanitarian access and MONUSCO mobility. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, UN peacekeeping chief, warned of a "regional flare-up with incalculable consequences," yet the mission's mandate remains tied to political timelines that insurgents ignore.
The Security Council's language in Resolution 2808 was unequivocal, citing a "rapidly deteriorating security and humanitarian crisis" driven by M23 offensives "with the direct support and participation of the Rwanda Defence Forces." Burundi condemned cross-border strikes and Uvira's fall; regional tensions escalated. Yet enforcement mechanisms remained weak, and the dual-track system offered M23 room to maneuver between Doha commitments and Washington state-level diplomacy.
Structural flaws, tactical advantage
The Washington Accords' failure to integrate the armed actor with the greatest territorial control and operational capacity was a predictable vulnerability. M23 used the gap between state-to-state commitments and insurgent verification to announce withdrawals, reposition forces, entrench civilian administration in occupied zones, and constrain peacekeepers—all while maintaining plausible deniability under the Doha framework. The ceremony in Washington proceeded; the guns in Uvira did not stop.
Whether the REIF's minerals-driven integration can generate stability depends on enforcement credibility that has yet to materialize. U.S. bandwidth and long-term commitment remain uncertain amid competing global crises. Without binding security benchmarks, verified withdrawal timelines, accountability for abuses, and inclusive political negotiations that address citizenship, land, and governance, the accords risk becoming another framework that formalizes economic extraction while conflict persists. The Uvira offensive and M23's tactical deceptions suggest that, absent consequences, dual-track diplomacy offers insurgents not peace, but leverage.
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