- June 20 Konduga suicide bombing ends year-long lull, signaling JAS tactical shift amid ISWAP's coordinated offensive
- ISWAP launched twelve attacks on military bases in 2025, aided by weaponized drones and foreign fighters
- Regional cooperation collapsed as Niger withdrew from MNJTF, creating operational vacuums exploited by insurgents
On the evening of June 20, 2025, a female suicide bomber detonated explosives at a militia gathering near the fish market in Konduga town, Borno State, killing at least 20 anti-jihadist fighters and injuring 18 others. The attack, occurring just 25 kilometers southeast of the state capital Maiduguri, shattered a year-long lull in suicide bombings across northeastern Nigeria—a tactic that had become horrifyingly synonymous with Boko Haram's insurgency but had largely disappeared from the region's conflict landscape since 2024.
The Konduga bombing represents more than an isolated incident of violence. It signals a potential strategic shift by Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS)—the Boko Haram faction known for its brutal targeting of civilians—at a moment when the broader security situation in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin has significantly deteriorated during the first half of 2025. This deterioration stems primarily from the renewed strategic vigor of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Boko Haram's more sophisticated splinter group, which has launched at least twelve coordinated attacks on military bases and infrastructure across Borno State in recent months.
As Nigeria enters the sixteenth year of this devastating conflict—one that has killed more than 35,000 people and displaced at least 2.5 million—the question confronting security analysts and humanitarian workers alike is whether the return of suicide bombings heralds a broader resurgence of indiscriminate violence against civilians, or whether it represents the desperate tactics of a weakened insurgency struggling to maintain relevance in a shifting battlefield.
The tactical evolution of Nigeria's twin insurgencies
The security landscape in northeastern Nigeria has become increasingly complex since Boko Haram's split in 2016. While both factions share jihadist ideology, their operational approaches have diverged dramatically, creating distinct threat profiles that have shaped the conflict's trajectory over the past nine years.ISWAP's emergence in 2015 signaled what analysts describe as "a frightening new dimension in the operations, scale, and sustainability of terrorism in the region, anchored on an ingenuine but sophisticated insurgent governance model.
This model was built on two operational pillars: strategic violence targeting security forces and the provision of social services to local communities. Unlike the disproportionately violent and ideologically ultra-charged approach of Boko Haram under Abubakar Shekau, ISWAP adopted a more bureaucratic structure that generally spared Muslim non-combatants, focusing attacks on hard targets such as government and security personnel.
This strategic differentiation proved consequential. In the course of 2023, JAS gained ground in intra-jihadist fighting, halting ISWAP's previous momentum and taking most of the islands in Lake Chad that ISWAP had controlled. The conflict between these Boko Haram splinters stems from fundamental disagreements over governance and treatment of civilians—JAS kills and steals from everyone, while the more bureaucratic ISWAP generally spares Muslim non-combatants.
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The collapsing counterinsurgency framework
Nigeria's military response to the escalating insurgency has been hampered by systemic weaknesses that extend far beyond tactical considerations. The Nigerian military is now deployed across two-thirds of the country, stretched thin by simultaneous threats of jihadist insurgency, criminal groups, and communal violence. The merging of ideological extremism with economic motives and criminality makes it increasingly difficult to identify perpetrators or respond effectively.
The supercamp strategy, once heralded as Nigeria's solution to consolidating military strength, has become a strategic liability. Many of these installations are underfunded and poorly fortified due to corruption and mismanagement, leaving them exposed to attacks and looting. ISWAP has found repeated success in attacking supercamps through a combination of nighttime raids, targeted isolation of bases by detonating surrounding roads and bridges, and the accumulation of a growing stockpile of looted weapons to facilitate future incursions.
On April 30, ISWAP attempted to isolate the strategically significant town of Damboa by detonating improvised explosive devices on bridges along the Biu-Damboa road, cutting off reinforcements and constraining the military's response. These attacks reflect a sophisticated strategy of infrastructure sabotage and base encirclement, aimed at weakening the military's logistical resilience and achieving the symbolic victory of acquiring a town that hosts a strong military presence due to its position as a key humanitarian distribution hub for internally displaced persons fleeing jihadist violence.
Frontline troops have reported poor welfare, inadequate equipment, and delayed salaries despite Nigeria's rising defense budget. Many soldiers see the government as channeling resources into high-profile rehabilitation schemes while neglecting the needs of those fighting on the front lines. Some soldiers, due to institutional neglect and financial strain, have leaked sensitive information to Boko Haram—betrayals that are devastating in a conflict that depends on trust and cohesion.
Regional fragmentation and the collapse of cooperation
International military cooperation across the Lake Chad Basin has deteriorated significantly, creating operational vacuums that insurgent groups have exploited. Niger's withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in March 2025—following its 2023 coup—has compromised intelligence sharing efforts and disrupted joint military operations across porous borders. Chad also threatened to exit the alliance in 2024, highlighting the challenges in maintaining regional cooperation.Strained diplomatic relations between Abuja and Niamey following Niger's transition to junta leadership have created operational vacuums along the Niger-Nigeria border. The collapse of their joint military presence has been exploited by jihadist and criminal groups operating in the region. The MNJTF, a regional military coalition formed to combat insurgencies in the Lake Chad region and comprised of military personnel from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin, has seen its effectiveness significantly diminished.
What satellite intelligence reveals about foreign fighter infiltration routes from Mali and Niger. How ISWAP's Maktab al-Furqan office coordinates with IS core. Why southern Nigeria's economic heartland now faces unprecedented jihadist expansion risk
The humanitarian crisis and failed rehabilitation efforts
The conflict's human toll extends far beyond battlefield casualties. More than 2.4 million people in the region have been displaced, with the number of people in need of urgent assistance in northeast Nigeria rising to 10.6 million since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Displacement away from infrastructure leads to poor sanitation, water-borne diseases, and increased risk of communicable diseases.
Children have borne a disproportionate burden of the violence. In 2018, Nigeria had the second-highest number of children recruited for roles in conflict globally—1,947 children, comprising 1,596 boys and 351 girls. Nigeria also recorded the third-highest number of abductions that year. By 2017, Boko Haram had recruited approximately 8,000 children. Multiple instances of grave violations against children have been reported, including death, maiming, rape, other sexual violence, detention, and attacks on schools and hospitals.
Nigeria launched Operation Safe Corridor in 2016, a state-run initiative for low-risk former Boko Haram and ISWAP members who have surrendered or been captured. The program involves various ministries, departments, and agencies of the Nigerian government, alongside the armed forces and other security institutions. It is coordinated by the Office of the Chief of Defence Staff and receives both technical and partial financial support from non-state partners such as the Centre for Democracy and Development.
However, the program has faced significant criticism from soldiers on the front lines. Many see it as channeling resources into rehabilitation while neglecting the needs of those fighting the insurgency. Some fear the program may serve as a way for insurgents to regroup before rejoining the fight. Yet glimpses of hope emerge—soldiers described moments when ex-combatants provided actionable intelligence that disrupted Boko Haram operations, saving lives and reducing violence.
Girls and young women who escaped Boko Haram captivity face particularly acute challenges. Many endured abduction, forced marriage, sexual slavery, and other crimes against humanity during their time in insurgent control. After escaping, some experienced further abuse in prolonged and unlawful Nigerian military detention, though this practice has become less widespread in recent years. Those not unlawfully detained were left to fend for themselves in displacement camps amid millions of other people needing humanitarian assistance.
One year after Amnesty International's landmark report on girl survivors, the situation remains dire. Survivors told researchers in February 2025 that the government is still failing to provide adequate reintegration services and they are unable to support themselves or their families. None of the survivors interviewed were offered tailored reintegration services or made aware of available counseling, vocational training, or other support programs.
The path forward: Beyond military solutions
President Bola Tinubu, responding to the June 20 suicide bombing, directed security forces to "rout the remnants of Boko Haram" in a statement posted on social media. The language echoes years of similar declarations—the Nigerian military has repeatedly claimed to have defeated Boko Haram despite ongoing attacks against civilians and military targets.
This persistent gap between rhetoric and reality underscores a fundamental challenge: peace cannot be won by force alone. Nigeria must offer pathways out for those willing to abandon violence, while simultaneously addressing the root causes that enable insurgent recruitment and territorial control.
Without commitment and operationalization of a whole-of-society approach embedded in good governance and sustainable human security, ISWAP and JAS may continue their campaigns of terror unabated. The country needs to reemphasize its strategic line of sight, recognizing that the national counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operation is not only for the security forces, but a war that all Nigerians must fight, led by patriotic and uncompromising political will from the government.
Social initiatives and political reforms remain crucial for confronting root causes of conflict, including poor governance, corruption, poverty—exacerbated by the worst economic crisis in decades—youth unemployment, environmental degradation, and climate change. Local peace commissions established to mediate inter-communal tensions and build early warning systems, such as those in Adamawa, Kaduna, and Plateau states, need to be duplicated in other high-risk regions.
The international community's role remains critical but must evolve beyond military assistance. The U.S. Department of Treasury designated a network of six individuals connected to Boko Haram in 2021 for establishing a cell in the United Arab Emirates to raise funds and provide material assistance to insurgents in Nigeria. Such financial disruption efforts must continue alongside humanitarian support and pressure for governance reforms.
The Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court concluded a preliminary examination into Nigeria in December 2020, finding reasonable grounds to believe Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. In March 2024, ICC Deputy Prosecutor and national authorities discussed progress in holding perpetrators accountable. In December 2024, Amnesty International submitted a complaint to the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber on behalf of several victims' networks requesting an end to the unacceptable delay in starting the court's investigation.
Conclusion
The June 20 suicide bombing in Konduga represents more than the tragic loss of 20 lives—it signals a potential inflection point in Nigeria's long-running insurgency. The return of indiscriminate suicide attacks, combined with ISWAP's sophisticated military offensive and the collapse of regional cooperation, suggests the conflict is entering a new and potentially more dangerous phase.
Three critical insights emerge from this analysis. First, the fragmentation of Boko Haram into competing factions has not weakened the overall insurgent threat; instead, it has created a more complex security landscape where different groups employ distinct tactics that collectively strain Nigeria's overstretched military. Second, the failure to address governance deficits, provide adequate support for displaced populations, and offer meaningful reintegration pathways ensures a steady supply of recruits for insurgent groups. Third, the deterioration of regional cooperation and the influx of foreign fighters create conditions for potential expansion beyond current conflict zones.
Over the next 6-12 months, Nigeria faces a critical window to prevent further escalation. The military must consolidate gains while avoiding the mistakes that made supercamps vulnerable to attack. Humanitarian assistance must reach affected populations, particularly girls and young women escaping insurgent captivity. Regional partners must rebuild cooperation mechanisms despite political tensions. International supporters must balance security assistance with pressure for governance reforms and accountability.
The conflict that began sixteen years ago has already stolen the childhoods of thousands, displaced millions, and killed tens of thousands—the costs of continued failure will only compound these tragedies, propagating cycles of violence and disadvantage for generations to come.
