- Libya's rival institutions have failed to jointly discuss electoral frameworks, with HNEC reconstitution deadlocked due to fundamental lack of political will
- UNSMIL's August 2025 roadmap targets elections within 12-18 months but warns of pursuing alternatives if obstruction continues
- Foreign military presence by Russia and Turkey has become increasingly covert while maintaining strategic influence over rival factions
The warning came with stark clarity in October 2025: Libya's political transition hangs in the balance. As UN Special Representative Hanna Serwaa Tetteh briefed the Security Council on October 14, she delivered an urgent message—the country's rival institutions have yet to even jointly discuss the constitutional and legal framework necessary for elections, while the deadlock over reconstituting the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) board reveals a broader, more troubling reality: a fundamental lack of political will among Libya's leaders.
For a nation that has endured more than a decade of division since Muammar Gaddafi's fall in 2011, this moment represents a critical juncture. Libya remains split between the UN-recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah, and the eastern Government of National Stability (GNS), backed by the House of Representatives and General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army. The indefinite postponement of the 2021 elections continues to cast a long shadow, and the question now facing Libyans and the international community alike is whether the country can break free from its cycle of interim governments and institutional paralysis—or whether it will slide deeper into fragmentation and instability.
The anatomy of a stalemate
The political impasse gripping Libya in October 2025 is not merely a technical disagreement over electoral procedures. It represents a fundamental contest over power, legitimacy, and the future shape of the Libyan state. The House of Representatives and the High Council of State—the two bodies that should be collaborating to establish the legal foundations for elections—have not managed to convene joint discussions on the critical constitutional and electoral frameworks needed to move forward.
This institutional paralysis extends to the High National Elections Commission itself. The deadlock over reconstituting the HNEC board is particularly revealing, as Tetteh characterized it as "indicative of a broader lack of political will".
Without a functioning, credibly constituted electoral commission, the prospect of organizing free and fair elections remains distant, regardless of any political agreements that might be reached on other fronts.
The UK's Ambassador James Kariuki captured the gravity of the situation in his statement to the Security Council, declaring that "the status quo is simply not sustainable." He emphasized that "Libya's political impasse continues to deprive its people of the democratic choice, economic opportunity, and security they deserve."
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UNSMIL's roadmap and the push for dialogue
Recognizing the depth of the crisis, UNSMIL has developed a comprehensive approach to break the impasse. In August 2025, Special Representative Tetteh presented the Security Council with a roadmap designed to lead Libya toward national elections and unified institutions. The UK welcomed this initiative, with Ambassador Kariuki stating that "we joined Council members in welcoming the roadmap presented by SRSG Tetteh in August and we urge the Libyan parties to fully engage with the process to enable free, fair, transparent and inclusive elections.
The roadmap rests on three core pillars: adopting a viable electoral framework for presidential and legislative polls; unifying institutions under a new government; and launching a structured dialogue on governance, economic, security, and reconciliation issues. UNSMIL envisions implementation as a sequenced package, with each step enabling the next toward national elections within 12 to 18 months.
The mission's immediate priorities are clear and time-sensitive. According to Security Council briefings, reconstituting the HNEC board, ensuring its financial independence, and amending the electoral framework could be completed before November 2025—but only if there is the necessary political will. After these technical steps, agreement on a unified government would be required to create conditions for credible elections.
To broaden participation beyond the political elite, UNSMIL plans to launch national dialogue sessions in November 2025. These sessions will involve civil society, youth, and women, focusing on governance, security, economy, and national reconciliation. This inclusive approach aims to ensure that Libya's political process reflects the aspirations of all segments of society, not just armed factions and their political representatives.
What happens if obstruction continues?
UNSMIL has made clear that it will not allow spoilers to indefinitely derail the process. Tetteh has indicated that if obstruction occurs at any stage, the mission will pursue alternatives and seek Security Council support to prevent further transitional deadlock. This represents a significant shift from previous approaches that allowed Libyan actors to veto progress without consequence.
The August 2025 municipal elections, which saw attempts to disrupt voting in some municipalities through attacks on HNEC offices in Zawiya, Zliten, and Sahel Al Gharbi, demonstrated both the desire of ordinary Libyans to participate in democratic processes and the willingness of some actors to use violence to prevent them. Despite these disruptions, the elections proceeded with approximately 72 percent turnout in the municipalities where they were held—a significant engagement that indicates public appetite for democratic participation.
The Security Council issued a press statement on September 3, 2025, welcoming Tetteh's roadmap and urging Libyan stakeholders to "fully engage in and make the compromises necessary to advance a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned process.
The statement also called upon the international community to support this process, while urging all Libyan parties to respect the 2020 ceasefire and refrain from actions that could endanger the fragile security situation.
Security dynamics and the fragility of peace
The political stalemate cannot be separated from Libya's security landscape. While the 2020 ceasefire has largely held, preventing a return to the large-scale warfare that characterized the 2019-2020 Tripoli offensive, the security environment remains precarious. Armed clashes and militia violence persist, particularly in western Libya and around Tripoli.
Security tensions in Tripoli have eased somewhat due to mediation efforts among the GNU and local security actors, with Turkey's involvement contributing to improved stability. However, the underlying competition for control of resources and territory has not been resolved. Human Rights Watch documented that in May 2025, heavy fighting broke out between armed groups in Tripoli following the killing of Abdelghani "Ghneiwa" al-Kikli, commander of the Stability Support Apparatus. The clashes, which lasted two days before a truce came into force on May 14, resulted in civilian deaths and damage to homes.
The UN has warned repeatedly about the dangers of military buildup in densely populated areas. UNSMIL statements in 2025 expressed concern over continued reports of armed group mobilization in residential neighborhoods, urging all parties to refrain from the use of force and inflammatory rhetoric. The Mission stressed that "those responsible for attacks against civilians will be held accountable."
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The human cost of political paralysisWhile political elites negotiate over institutional arrangements, ordinary Libyans bear the consequences of the prolonged transition. The UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Nada Al-Nashif, told the Human Rights Council in October 2025 that "any sustainable political settlement for Libya must be anchored in justice and human rights." She emphasized that Libya's transition is challenged by "a long—and continuing—legacy of serious human rights violations and abuses.
The human rights situation remains dire. Civic space continues to come under sustained attack, with perceived political opponents, journalists, and civil society systematically targeted as a means of stifling dissent. Between March 2024 and September 2025, the UN verified the deaths of 20 individuals in custody, many of whom were deemed to be political opponents. Al-Nashif noted that "the Libyan authorities remain either unwilling or unable to bring perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice.
The economic dimension of the crisis affects every Libyan. In August 2024, a political standoff over the Central Bank's leadership resulted in longtime Governor Siddiq al-Kabir fleeing the country and suspending banking operations. In retaliation, eastern authorities shuttered oil fields and terminals. A new central bank governor was sworn in on September 30 following UN mediation, but the crisis highlighted the fragility of Libya's economic institutions.
The suspension of banking operations froze issuance of letters of credit and deepened economic hardship. The suspension of crude oil sales—which represent 90 percent of Libya's exports and its sole national income source—resulted in the depreciation of the local currency. For ordinary Libyans dependent on public sector salaries and subsidized goods, such disruptions translate directly into diminished living standards and economic insecurity.
The path forward and the stakes for regional stability
The choice facing Libya's political actors is stark. They can engage constructively with UNSMIL's roadmap, make the necessary compromises to establish electoral frameworks and reconstitute the HNEC, and move toward elections that could finally end the country's protracted transition. Or they can continue to prioritize narrow factional interests, allowing the political impasse to deepen and risking a return to wider conflict.
The international community has signaled its expectations. The Security Council's September 2025 press statement made clear that continued obstruction will not be tolerated indefinitely. UNSMIL has indicated it will seek alternative approaches and Council backing if current engagement fails to produce results. The renewal of the UNSMIL mandate, which expired on October 31, 2025, provides an opportunity for the international community to reinforce its support for the mission's efforts while making clear the consequences of non-cooperation.
Regional dynamics add urgency to the situation. The spillover effects of Libya's instability affect migration flows to Europe, security in the Sahel region, and the balance of power in the Mediterranean. The European Union's engagement on migration issues—including a July 2025 delegation visit that eastern authorities rejected as a breach of diplomatic norms—demonstrates the interconnection between Libya's internal crisis and broader regional concerns.
Libya's neighbors and international partners have diverse and sometimes competing interests, but they share a stake in preventing the country from becoming a failed state. Egypt, Turkey, the UAE, Russia, France, and Italy all pursue discrete interests in Libya, influencing the actions of Libyan groups and at times contributing to competition and stalemates. Aligning these external actors behind a coherent approach to supporting Libya's political transition remains a significant challenge.
A moment of decision
As Libya approaches the end of 2025, the urgency of Tetteh's October warning resonates with particular force. The technical steps needed to enable elections—reconstituting the HNEC board, ensuring its financial independence, amending the electoral framework—are achievable within months if political will exists. The broader political agreements on a unified interim government and constitutional basis for elections are more complex, but the roadmap provides a viable path forward.
The question is whether Libya's political leaders will seize this opportunity or allow it to slip away. The consequences of continued paralysis are clear: deepening institutional divisions, economic deterioration, erosion of the 2020 ceasefire, and the risk of renewed large-scale conflict. The alternative—constructive engagement with the UN-facilitated process, compromise on contentious issues, and a genuine commitment to allowing Libyans to choose their leaders through democratic elections—offers a path out of the crisis.
For the Libyan people, who have endured more than a decade of political instability, economic hardship, and insecurity, the stakes could not be higher. The 72 percent turnout in the August 2025 municipal elections, despite attempts at disruption, demonstrates their desire to participate in shaping their country's future. Whether their political leaders will demonstrate the same commitment to democratic processes remains the critical question as Libya's political transition enters what may prove to be a decisive phase.
