DRC-M23 Ceasefire Monitor: Can Doha Deal End Congo War?

• DRC-M23 monitoring mechanism signed in Doha creates verification infrastructure but lacks enforcement power to prevent ceasefire violations
• Fundamental territorial dispute persists: DRC demands unconditional M23 withdrawal while rebels refuse to vacate mineral-rich areas they control
• Regional escalation risk remains high with Rwandan, Burundian, Ugandan forces potentially triggering broader Great Lakes conflict affecting millions

The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group signed an agreement in Doha on October 14 to establish a ceasefire monitoring mechanism—a diplomatic step hailed by mediators as progress, yet one that arrives amid relentless violence on the ground. Even as representatives shook hands in Qatar's capital, M23 fighters were conducting counterinsurgency operations against pro-government militias in North Kivu's Rutshuru district, while Congolese army drones struck M23-controlled mining infrastructure in South Kivu. The agreement represents the latest attempt to operationalize a July ceasefire that has existed largely on paper, repeatedly violated by all sides in a conflict that has displaced over 7 million people and created one of the world's most acute humanitarian emergencies.

The monitoring mechanism will include equal representation from Kinshasa and M23, with Qatar, the United States, and the African Union participating as observers. According to the signed document, the body will investigate reported violations and communicate with relevant parties to prevent renewed hostilities. Yet the question hanging over this diplomatic achievement is whether any monitoring body can succeed where previous agreements have failed—especially when the fundamental issue of territorial control remains unresolved, and when fighting has intensified rather than diminished since the original ceasefire was signed three months ago.

Can a verification mechanism bring accountability to a conflict where both sides routinely accuse each other of violations, where parallel peace processes create competing frameworks, and where the stakes—control of mineral-rich territory, ethnic security, and regional power—remain as high as ever?

The Doha framework: Building oversight into a broken ceasefire

The October 14 agreement emerged from the sixth round of Qatari-mediated discussions between the DRC government and M23, following a July 19 Declaration of Principles that committed both parties to a ceasefire. That earlier agreement went into effect immediately with a grace period until July 29, and set an ambitious timeline to start negotiations for a final agreement by August 8 and sign a comprehensive deal by August 18. Those deadlines came and went without resolution.

The new monitoring mechanism represents an attempt to address the implementation gap that has plagued previous agreements. According to the Qatari Foreign Ministry statement, the body will "investigate and verify reported violations" and work to prevent a resumption of hostilities. The mechanism will draw representatives from the 12-country International Conference on the Great Lakes Region alongside the DRC and M23 delegations, with MONUSCO—the UN peacekeeping mission currently in the process of withdrawing from the DRC—providing logistical support.

US President Donald Trump's Africa advisor, Massad Boulos, described the agreement as a "critical step" toward implementing the separate US-brokered peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda signed in Washington on June 27. That bilateral agreement, which focused heavily on economic cooperation around critical minerals and required Rwanda to withdraw troops in exchange for DRC action against the FDLR (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda), explicitly deferred resolution of the M23 conflict to the Qatari-led process.

The architecture of overlapping agreements creates both opportunity and confusion. The US-Rwanda-DRC deal addresses state-to-state relations and economic frameworks. The Doha process handles the DRC-M23 relationship directly. Both are meant to work in tandem, yet they operate on different timelines with different stakeholders, creating space for either coordination or contradiction.

M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka called the monitoring agreement "a significant advancement" on social media, while the Congolese government reaffirmed its "desire to achieve a cessation of hostilities, to guarantee the security of the population, and to prepare the conditions for a comprehensive and lasting peace agreement." Qatar described the mechanism as a "pivotal step toward enhancing confidence-building and moving forward toward a comprehensive peace agreement."

Violence continues: The gap between diplomatic progress and ground reality

The signing ceremony in Doha took place against a backdrop of intensifying violence that exposed the fragility of diplomatic commitments. From October 10 to October 12, M23 conducted operations against pro-government Wazalendo fighters and suspected FDLR militants near Bambo village in the Tongo group of Rutshuru district's Bwito chiefdom. The clashes spread across at least three villages in the area.

Starting October 13, M23 expanded its counterinsurgency campaign, engaging Wazalendo and FDLR forces in more than a dozen villages near the Bukumbo group capital in Bwito chiefdom. These operations represent a continuation of M23's effort to consolidate control over territory it has seized since its 2022 resurgence, when the group broke a five-year period of relative dormancy.

The Congolese army, meanwhile, carried out multiple drone strikes between October 10 and October 15 on an M23-controlled industrial gold mine in Mwenga district, South Kivu, causing significant infrastructure damage. The strikes targeted a facility that represents a key revenue source for M23, which has systematically expanded its control over lucrative mining sites including Rubaya—Congo's largest coltan producer, seized in May 2024. While estimates vary widely, with some sources citing 1,000 tons annually and others reporting between 6,000 to 7,000 tons, Rubaya represents a critical source of the DRC's total coltan production, which accounts for roughly 40 percent of global output.

In Masisi district, Wazalendo fighters repelled M23 attacks in Birihi and Ndeko villages in the Bashali Mokoto group on October 13. Near Nyabiondo on the RP529 highway in Walikale district, M23 recaptured Kibati village from Wazalendo fighters who had briefly occupied it between October 10 and October 12, forcing the militia to withdraw.

The pattern of violence reveals both sides' strategic calculations. M23's counterinsurgency operations in Rutshuru aim to eliminate threats to its rear areas and supply lines, particularly from FDLR elements that Rwanda views as an existential threat linked to the 1994 genocide. The Congolese army's drone strikes on mining infrastructure represent an attempt to degrade M23's economic base without committing ground forces to costly offensive operations.

Critically, no major territorial changes occurred during this period—a status quo that both enables and undermines peace efforts. The lack of dramatic shifts reduces immediate pressure for either side to make concessions, yet the ongoing low-intensity conflict prevents the confidence-building that any monitoring mechanism requires to function effectively.

The UN facilitated the repatriation of nearly 400 Rwandan refugees from eastern DRC back to Rwanda between October 10 and October 15 as part of the US-brokered peace agreement's provisions. These returns, part of a formal tripartite mechanism involving the DRC, Rwanda, and UNHCR, occur under the shadow of M23's systematic campaign to identify and repatriate suspected FDLR families—a process the rebels frame as voluntary return but which many Congolese view as forced displacement.

The fundamental impasse: What "restoring state authority" actually means

The core obstacle to lasting peace remains the irreconcilable interpretations of territorial control. Within hours of signing the July Declaration of Principles, DRC and M23 officials offered fundamentally different readings of what "restoring state authority" means in practice.

The Congolese communications minister stated that restoration encompasses M23's "nonnegotiable" withdrawal and the return of the Congolese army, police, and judicial and civil authorities to M23-occupied areas. M23 officials countered that "nowhere" in the declaration "does it say that M23 must withdraw" from occupied territory, and reiterated that the group will not vacate areas it controls. The M23 president implied on social media that M23 itself represents "the State" and that the agreement "is not about withdrawal but about mechanisms to empower the State."

This is not mere semantic disagreement—it reflects fundamentally incompatible visions for eastern Congo's future. The DRC demands unconditional M23 withdrawal and refuses to integrate M23 forces into Congolese institutions as organized units. M23, backed by Rwanda, seeks an arrangement that legitimizes its control of parts of eastern DRC, potentially through political integration that would allow the AFC-M23 coalition to govern these areas as a recognized political entity.

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Regional dimensions: A conflict that could expand far beyond Congo's borders

The eastern DRC conflict exists within a complex regional system where the interests of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and multiple armed groups intersect, creating the potential for escalation into a broader Great Lakes war reminiscent of the conflicts of the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Rwanda's involvement extends well beyond support for M23. UN experts reported in June 2024 that between 4,000 and 12,000 Rwandan troops operate in eastern DRC, providing not just material support but direct combat participation. The same UN investigation found that many M23 personnel are actually from the Rwanda Defense Force, fighting embedded within or alongside the rebel group. Rwanda frames its intervention as necessary to combat the FDLR, an ethnic Hutu armed group with ties to the 1994 genocide that Kigali views as an existential threat.

The US-brokered peace agreement attempted to address this dynamic by requiring the DRC to "neutralize" the FDLR in exchange for Rwandan troop withdrawal. The plan follows a previous Angolan-mediated concept of operations that was never implemented after talks collapsed in late 2024. However, the arrangement faces fundamental problems: M23 now controls many areas where FDLR operates, making it difficult for Congolese forces to conduct anti-FDLR operations without M23 withdrawal. Yet Rwanda insists its forces will not withdraw until after the FARDC degrades the FDLR—not before or in parallel.

Burundi adds another volatile element. The Burundi National Defense Force has deployed several thousand soldiers to fight alongside Congolese forces against M23, viewing the conflict through the lens of its own confrontation with Rwanda. Burundi accuses Rwanda of supporting rebels seeking to overthrow its government, while Rwanda accuses Burundi of collaborating with FDLR elements. In early 2025, as M23 advanced toward Bukavu in South Kivu, Burundian forces faced the prospect of encirclement. South Kivu's proximity to Bujumbura—just a 25-minute drive across Lake Tanganyika—means fighting in the province directly threatens Burundian security.

Uganda's role remains ambiguous but potentially significant. While Kampala signed a bilateral agreement with Kinshasa authorizing military operations against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—an Islamic State-affiliated group operating in eastern DRC—Ugandan military chief Muhoozi Kainerugaba has made favorable comments about M23's cause. UN experts have noted potential coordination between M23, Rwanda, and Uganda, though Uganda officially denies supporting the rebels. Ugandan forces' seizure of Bunia, capital of Ituri Province, ostensibly to counter the ADF, occurred simultaneously with M23's drive toward the same area, raising questions about alignment.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployed 1,300 troops to support the DRC against M23, but the mission has proven ineffective. In January 2025, firefights between M23 and SADC forces during the battle for Goma resulted in 20 deaths among soldiers from South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania. SAMIDRC forces are now confined to their bases in Goma and Sake under M23 watch. South Africa holds Rwanda responsible for these losses and has warned that further attacks would constitute a "declaration of war"—to which Rwandan President Paul Kagame responded that "if South Africa prefers confrontation, Rwanda will deal with the matter in that context any day."

The potential for regional escalation is not theoretical—it's historical. The Second Congo War (1998-2003) drew in nine African countries and is widely considered the deadliest conflict since World War II, with estimates of up to 6 million deaths. The current configuration of forces, grievances, and interests bears uncomfortable similarities to that period's opening stages.

The humanitarian catastrophe: Seven million displaced and counting

While diplomats negotiate in Doha and Washington, the human cost of the conflict continues to mount at a staggering scale. The DRC had 7 million internally displaced persons in 2023—the highest number ever recorded for any country, according to UN figures. At least 5.5 million people are displaced in eastern DRC alone, including 2.5 million in North Kivu province.

The displacement crisis has multiple dimensions that compound its severity. Only 20 percent of displaced people reach camps where humanitarian organizations can provide assistance. The remaining 80 percent are absorbed by host communities already strained by years of violence and economic disruption. Recent fighting has disrupted main agricultural transport roads linking towns in North and South Kivu, severely impacting food security and economic activity, particularly in Goma, which hosts over a million people who fled M23's advance.

The World Food Programme reported in mid-2025 that 28 million people—nearly a quarter of the DRC's 113.6 million population—require urgent food assistance. The malnutrition crisis affects millions of children globally, with international estimates indicating that approximately 42.8 million children under five face acute malnutrition worldwide, including severe cases affecting roughly 12.2 million children—figures that underscore the scale of the global humanitarian emergency in which the DRC crisis is embedded. The increase in malnutrition is directly linked to conflict-driven displacement, with over 7.8 million people now internally displaced in eastern DRC as of August 2025—the highest figure on record.

Healthcare infrastructure has collapsed in many areas. UNHCR reported that over 14,800 schools had closed in the region by mid-2025, leaving 3 million children without access to education or safe spaces. The UN reproductive health agency UNFPA documented 33 attacks on health workers and facilities in the first half of 2025—a 276 percent increase from the previous six months. Medical facilities that remain operational lack supplies and strain under growing numbers of displaced, sick, and wounded people.

The ICRC-supported CBCA Ndosho Hospital in Goma admitted over 1,000 people with weapon wounds in 2023, including nearly 200 women and 40 children under 15—a 60 percent increase over 2022. In January and February 2024, the hospital admission rate for wounded patients doubled compared to 2023. Over 75 percent of patients were injured by firearms, while blast injuries rose from 1.72 percent in 2022 to 7.18 percent in 2023.

Sexual violence remains a pervasive weapon of war. UN reports documented systematic sexual violence by multiple armed groups, with women and girls representing 80 percent of forcibly displaced people in the region. Gender-based violence is described as a "critical and pervasive concern" across displacement sites and conflict zones.

The humanitarian response faces severe constraints. The abrupt closure of the U.S. Agency for International Development in July 2025 eliminated the largest donor to the DRC, which had provided over $6 billion in humanitarian and development assistance over the past decade and funded 70 percent of the 2024 humanitarian response plan. An aid worker told CNN that an order for 100,000 post-rape kits—including medications for preventing HIV and other STDs—was canceled, with "devastating consequences" for survivors of sexual violence.

Access challenges compound funding shortfalls. Humanitarian organizations struggle to reach populations in remote areas due to ongoing fighting, logistical obstacles, and security risks. The fighting in Rutshuru has made access to vulnerable populations in Rwanguba Health Zone particularly difficult, with the road between Bunagana and Burayi closed since June due to proximity to frontlines.

The political complexity: Kabila's shadow and Kinshasa's domestic struggles

The conflict's resolution is further complicated by internal Congolese political dynamics, particularly the fraught relationship between President Félix Tshisekedi and former President Joseph Kabila. This domestic power struggle shapes Kinshasa's negotiating posture in ways that external mediators often underestimate.

Tshisekedi came to power in 2019 through a power-sharing arrangement with Kabila that left substantial control with the former president. To compensate, Tshisekedi pursued regional diplomacy, enhancing security and economic cooperation with Rwanda and initiating dialogue with exiled M23 leaders. When Tshisekedi broke with Kabila in 2020 and consolidated power, Rwandan cooperation and M23 dialogue ended, enabling the group's November 2021 resurgence.

Corneille Nangaa, the former electoral commission chair who facilitated the 2019 power-sharing deal, subsequently formed the AFC political coalition that includes M23. This move reinforced Kinshasa's view of AFC-M23 as part of a Kabila-orchestrated challenge to Tshisekedi's authority, hardening the government's refusal to negotiate and its efforts to weaken the exiled Kabila.

Kabila reemerged publicly in late 2024 alongside Katangan politician Moïse Katumbi to oppose Tshisekedi's proposed constitutional reforms, making joint calls for national dialogue with opposition figures including Martin Fayulu. Kabila returned to the DRC in May 2025 via rebel-held eastern territory, where he has engaged in local dialogues with communities, religious and customary leaders, and rebel authorities.

Kabila positions himself as a potential peace broker, inspired by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue that ended the Second Congo War in 2002. However, Tshisekedi frames national dialogue around a divide between a "republican front" and a "rebel front" linked to Rwanda, AFC-M23, and Kabila. The president hopes the peace deal with Rwanda will strengthen his domestic position and enable a unity government opposed to the country's "balkanization."

This domestic political struggle creates perverse incentives. Tshisekedi cannot be seen as making concessions to M23 without appearing to validate Kabila's political relevance and the AFC's legitimacy. Any peace deal that integrates M23 politically could be portrayed domestically as Tshisekedi capitulating to forces aligned with his predecessor. Conversely, Kabila's potential role as mediator gives him leverage to extract political concessions, reversing legal and political actions taken against him, his family, and allies.

The National Episcopal Conference of Congo-Church of Christ in Congo (CENCO-ECC) has proposed a peace initiative calling for broad conversation on root causes of conflict in the east, potentially involving rebel groups. However, the government seeks to exclude AFC-M23 and its allies from such dialogue, viewing their inclusion as legitimizing insurgent violence.

What comes next: Scenarios for an uncertain future

The October 14 monitoring agreement creates a framework, but frameworks do not end wars—political will, military realities, and strategic calculations do. Several scenarios could unfold over the coming months, each with distinct implications for regional stability.

Scenario 1: Gradual implementation with continued low-intensity conflict. The monitoring mechanism begins operating, investigates violations, and produces reports that both sides selectively accept or reject. Fighting continues at current levels—counterinsurgency operations, drone strikes, localized clashes—without major territorial changes. This status quo could persist indefinitely, as neither side has sufficient military advantage to force a decisive outcome, yet neither faces enough pressure to make the concessions required for genuine peace. The humanitarian crisis continues to worsen, displacement grows, and the international community's attention gradually shifts elsewhere.

Scenario 2: Escalation and expanded M23 offensive. Frustrated by lack of progress in negotiations and confident in Rwandan backing, M23 launches new offensives along one or more of its three axes of advance: southward toward Bukavu and Uvira, northward toward Lubero and Butembo, or westward deeper into resource-rich areas. Such escalation could trigger direct confrontation between Rwandan and Burundian forces, draw in additional SADC troops, or provoke Ugandan intervention. The monitoring mechanism collapses as fighting intensifies, and the conflict regionalizes further.

Scenario 3: Negotiated settlement with territorial compromise. Sustained pressure from the United States, Qatar, and regional actors—combined with mutual exhaustion and economic incentives from the mineral cooperation framework—pushes both sides toward a compromise. This might involve M23's transformation into a legitimate political party with guaranteed representation in eastern provinces, partial integration of fighters into national forces, and a power-sharing arrangement for local governance. Rwanda withdraws most forces while maintaining security guarantees. The DRC accepts de facto autonomy for parts of North and South Kivu in exchange for nominal sovereignty. This scenario requires all parties to abandon maximalist positions—historically difficult in the DRC context.

Scenario 4: Regime change attempt and national conflict. AFC-M23 pursues its stated goal of marching to Kinshasa and overthrowing the Tshisekedi government. This would transform a regional insurgency into a national civil war, potentially fragmenting the DRC along multiple fault lines as other regions and factions choose sides. The humanitarian catastrophe would multiply exponentially, regional intervention would intensify, and the prospect of state collapse would emerge. This is the nightmare scenario that echoes the Congo Wars of the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The most likely near-term outcome is Scenario 1—a grinding continuation of the current situation with the monitoring mechanism providing diplomatic cover for ongoing violence. The fundamental issues remain unresolved: M23 will not voluntarily withdraw from territory it controls, the DRC will not voluntarily grant political legitimacy to a group it views as a foreign proxy, and Rwanda will not withdraw support while the FDLR remains active and Tutsi security concerns persist.

Yet even this "stable" scenario is unsustainable over the medium term. The humanitarian crisis will continue to worsen, creating conditions for disease outbreaks, famine, and further radicalization. The economic costs will mount as mining operations remain disrupted and trade routes stay closed. Regional tensions will simmer, with periodic flare-ups risking escalation. And the underlying political dynamics—both regional and domestic—will continue to evolve in ways that could suddenly shift the conflict's trajectory.

Conclusion: The hard work begins now

The October 14 monitoring agreement represents diplomatic progress in a conflict where progress has been rare. Qatar's mediation has brought the DRC and M23 to the table repeatedly, the United States has leveraged economic incentives to secure Rwandan and Congolese commitments, and the creation of a verification mechanism addresses a genuine implementation gap in previous agreements.

Yet the sobering reality is that monitoring mechanisms do not end wars—they merely create infrastructure to measure compliance with commitments that parties may or may not honor. The July ceasefire that this mechanism is meant to oversee has been violated consistently by all sides. The fundamental territorial dispute remains unresolved, with both parties maintaining maximalist positions that are mutually exclusive. The regional dimensions—Rwandan security concerns about the FDLR, Burundian fears of Rwandan expansion, Ugandan ambiguity, and SADC's limited capacity—create a complex environment where local ceasefires can be undermined by broader strategic calculations.

Three insights emerge from the current situation. First, the conflict cannot be resolved through the DRC-M23 track alone—it requires simultaneous progress on the DRC-Rwanda relationship, FDLR neutralization, Burundian security concerns, and the economic framework for mineral cooperation. The multiple parallel processes create both opportunities for linkage and risks of contradiction. Second, any sustainable peace will require addressing the political status of M23 and the AFC coalition, which means confronting difficult questions about power-sharing, autonomy, and the integration of armed groups that the DRC has long resisted. Third, the humanitarian catastrophe will continue to worsen until there is genuine progress on security, creating a moral imperative that transcends the diplomatic maneuvering.

The monitoring mechanism's success will ultimately depend on whether it can build confidence between parties that have none, verify compliance in areas where access is contested, and impose costs on violators when it has no enforcement powers. History suggests skepticism is warranted. But in a conflict where 7 million people are displaced, 28 million face food insecurity, and the specter of regional war looms, even modest progress toward accountability and transparency represents a fragile foundation on which more ambitious peace efforts might eventually be built. The question is whether that foundation can be constructed before the next escalation sweeps it away.